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A bedrock principle of patent law-patent exhaustion-proclaims that an authorized
sale of a patented article exhausts the patentee's rights with respect to the article sold.
Over one hundred and fifty years of case law, however, has produced two conflicting
notions of patent exhaustion, one considering exhaustion to be mandatory regardless of
whether the patentee subjects the sale to express patent restrictions, and another treating
exhaustion as a default rule that applies only in unconditional sales. The uncertainty
surrounding the patent exhaustion doctrine casts a significant legal cloud over patent
licensing practices in the modern economy and has emerged as a central subject in
scholarly debate on the nature and scope of intellectual property rights.
This Article takes a normative approach to patent exhaustion and argues that the correct
exhaustion rule should be a "default-plus" rule that combines a default-rule component
with a patent misuse test that is independent of the exhaustion analysis. The default-rule
component would allow patentees to avoid exhaustion through express patent restrictions,
while the patent misuse test would ensure that such restrictions do not violate public
policy. This Article contends that this default-plus rule is superior to the mandatory
rule in terms of theoretical foundation, malleability, and circumvention. Adopting
this default-plus rule would minimize legal impediments to socially beneficial patent
restrictions while preserving maximum flexibility in accommodating new technologies
and licensing practices.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, semiconductor chipset maker Broadcom, Inc. filed a lawsuit in
federal court against rival Qualcomm, Inc. in the latest iteration of long-running
patent disputes between the two industry giants.' Broadcom's suit centered
around Qualcomm's practice of collecting royalties for its cellular wireless patents
twice: once from chipset makers licensed to utilize Qualcomm's patents in man-
ufacturing chipsets, and once from handset makers who subsequently purchase
the patented chipsets and assemble them into handsets sold to consumers.
Broadcom alleged that Qualcomm's double royalty scheme violated the U.S.
patent law doctrine of exhaustion, according to which the authorized sale of a
patented article exhausts the patentee's ability to restrict how the purchaser uses
the article.3
Broadcom's lawsuit came on the heel of a landmark U.S. Supreme Court
decision earlier in the year in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., which
rejected a similar double royalty scheme on patent exhaustion grounds. But the
Quanta decision failed to bring clarity to this area of law because of the Court's
equivocation on the exact meaning of the exhaustion doctrine. In 2009, Broad-
com and Qualcomm reached a settlement, under which Qualcomm agreed to pay
$891 million to end the litigation and preserve its ability to seek patent royalty
revenues from cellphone handset makers that use Broadcom chipsets.6 The un-
certainty surrounding the patent exhaustion doctrine, however, did not end with




3. Id For general discussions of the exhaustion doctrine, see DONALD S. CHISUM, PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW: CASES ANDIMATERIALS 1136-38 (3d ed. 2004).
4. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). In Quanta, LG Electronics (LGE) licensed Intel to make, use, and sell
microprocessors and chipsets designed to practice several of LGE's method patents relating to
computer memory processing. The microprocessors and chipsets, however, had to be combined
with additional components to fully practice LGE's patents. In its license agreement with Intel,
LGE made dear that its license did not grant the right for third parties to combine Intel
microprocessors and chipsets with non-Intel products. Despite this restriction, Quanta Computer,
Inc. (Quanta) purchased Intel's microprocessors and chipsets and combined them with non-Intel
parts to build computers. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Quanta did not infringe LGE's
patents because Intel's sale of the microprocessors and chipsets exhausted LEG's ability to restrict the
use of the microprocessors and chipsets by subsequent purchasers like Quanta. See id at 621-33.
5. Specifically, the court failed to answer whether a patantee could ever bypass exhaustion through a
conditional sale. See infa notes 96-97 and accompanying text.




the settlement of this dispute. In two separate 2013 cases, the Supreme Court
again addressed patent exhaustion and its close counterpart in copyright law,
the first sale doctrine,' but in neither case did the Court provide improved gui-
dance for companies like Broadcom and Qualcomm.
The legal drama between Broadcom and Qualcomm demonstrates the deep
uneasiness surrounding the patent exhaustion doctrine. First developed by the
Supreme Court in the mid-nineteenth century, the patent exhaustion doctrine
has been reiterated in a long line of canonical cases stretching to the present day.9
Yet underneath the seemingly unequivocal mandate of patent exhaustion lies a
doctrine fraught with contradictions. Despite having habitually described patent
exhaustion as a mandatory rule that automatically cuts off a patentee's rights with
respect to a patented article that has been sold, 0 the Supreme Court has, on some
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2013) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
8. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013) (holding that the patent exhaustion
doctrine did not permit a farmer to replant patented seeds sold under the condition that the seeds
be planted in one growing season only); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351,
1358 (2013) (holding that the first sale doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully
made outside of the United States).
9. See Bowvman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (2013) ("[Bly exhausting the [patentee's] monopoly in that item,
the sale confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, the right to use [or] sell the thing as he
sees fit.") (alterations in original); Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630 (2008) ("[W]hen a patented item is once
lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the
patentee.") (alteration in original); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942)
("[S]ale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article."); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457 (1940) ("[B]y the authorized sales of the fuel by refiners
to jobbers the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and after the sale neither appellant nor the
refiners may longer rely on the patents to exercise any control over the price at which the fuel may
be resold."); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917)
("[T]he right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby
carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which the
vendor may attempt to put upon it."); Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913) ("[A]
patentee who has parted with a patented machine by passing tide to a purchaser has placed the
article beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act."); Keeler v. Standard Folding
Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) ("[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one
authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in
time or place."); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) ("[W]hen the patentee, or
the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives
the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use."); Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) ("[V]hen the machine passes to the hands of the
purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly.").
10. See cases cited in supra note 9. One particular example of the Court's use of absolutist language
regarding patent exhaustion can be found in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., where the Court
spoke of an "absolute property" acquired by purchasers of a patented article without qualifying it
based on whether the sale is subject to conditions. 157 U.S. at 666.
126 63 UCLA L. REv. 122 (2016)
occasions, upheld certain patent restrictions on purchasers as enforceable under
patent law." Adding to the confusion, beginning in the 1990s, the Federal Cir-
cuit, the nation's "patent court," has developed an alternative interpretation of
patent exhaustion, treating the doctrine as a default rule that applies only in un-
conditional sales.13 Under this default rule, patentees could still enforce a patent
restriction against a purchaser as long as the restriction is made an express condi-
tion of the sale.14
The uncertain status of patent exhaustion casts a significant legal cloud over
patent licensing in the modern economy. Unable to map out the exact contour
of patent exhaustion, the Federal Circuit once described the doctrine as a
proposition that "absent unusual circumstances, courts infer that a patent
owner has given up the right to exclude concerning a patented article that
the owner sells."" The use of the word "unusual" provides no guidance to pa-
tentees and licensees, who must grapple with patent exhaustion in a world con-
stantly bubbling with new technologies and new patent licensing practices."
Along with the first sale doctrine, patent exhaustion has also emerged as a
pivotal concept stirring academic debates on the nature and scope of intellectual
property rights." For proponents of patent exhaustion like Mark Lemley and
11. In 1872, the Court allowed a patentee to enforce its patent rights against a purchaser of patented
machines for using the machines during the extended term of the patent when the licensing
agreement under which the machines were manufactured by a licensee explicitly provided no
licenses beyond the original term of the patent. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544,
551 (1872). In 1912, the Court allowed a patentee to enforce a patent restriction that explicitly
required the patented machines to be used only with supplies made by the patentee. See Henry v.
A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1912). In 1938, the Court allowed patent rights to be enforced
against a commercial user of patented amplifiers when the amplifiers were sold under a license
expressly limiting the use of the machines to private use only. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v.
W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175,181-82 (1938).
12. The Federal Circuit has nearly exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent-related cases. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
13. See, e.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
a patentee could enforce an express restriction imposed in a conditional sale through infringement
actions); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a
patentee could enforce, through infringement actions, a "single use only" restriction on the use
of patented articles against parties that reconditioned and reused the articles).
14. See infa Part I.B.
15. Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added).
16. One example of the interaction of patent exhaustion with new technologies and new patent
licensing practices can be found in Bowvman v. Monsanto Co., a 2013 Supreme Court case dealing
with patent exhaustion in the genetically modified seeds industry. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). See infa
notes 189-199 and accompanying text.
17. For recent scholarly discussions of the patent exhaustion and first sale doctrines and their
significance for intellectual property law and beyond, see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Scope andInnovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30-35 (2001) (discussing
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Mark McKenna, the doctrine is a "powerful tool for reducing the market power
of an IP owner."" For critics like Richard Epstein, patent exhaustion and the first
sale doctrine are an "attack on the alienability of intellectual property licenses."19
Much of the focus of these debates, however, is on the historical foundation of
the doctrine. Adam Mossoff, for example, argues that patent exhaustion is his-
torically analogous to the rules American courts adopted in the nineteenth cent-
ury for conveyance of real property, not to the rules governing conveyance of
personal property.20 Similarly, John Osborne observed that "[e]xpress restric-
tions in patent licenses are analogous to restrictive covenants in real property law
which are enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of restricted property if the
purchaser had constructive notice of the restriction."
This Article contributes to the debate on patent exhaustion by focusing on
the normative aspects of the doctrine. Instead of dwelling on what courts may
have intended patent exhaustion to mean in the past, this Article explores what
patent exhaustion should mean in the future. Instead of focusing on historical
the patent exhaustion doctrine in the context of software patents); Richard A. Epstein, The
Disintegration oflntellectualProperty?A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 455, 507-11 (2010) (criticizing the patent exhaustion doctrine as an attack on the
alienation of intellectual property licenses and the classical liberal conception of property); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IPandAntitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133,2155 (2012) (arguing that
the constraints imposed under the patent exhaustion doctrine and the first sale doctrine are better
evaluated under the law of antitrust or misuse); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi
Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2115-17
(2012) (arguing that the patent exhaustion doctrine and the first sale doctrine are needed
limitations on the market power conferred by intellectual property rights); Adam Mossoff,A Simple
Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L. REV. 707, 709 (2009) (advocating for free
alienation of rights in patent conveyances); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 932-35 (2011) (discussing the common law path of the patent
exhaustion doctrine and its implications for copyright exhaustion in the digital marketplace); Glen
0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1464-69 (2004) (discussing
the patent exhaustion doctrine as an example of intellectual property law's inhospitality to chattel
servitudes); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 917-21 (2008)
(arguing that the patent exhaustion doctrine can be understood as an attempt to reduce
informational costs associated with identifying and verifying patent restrictions imposed through
notices).
18. Lemley &McKenna, supra note 17, at 2115.
19. Epstein, supra note 17, at 502.
20. See Mossoff, supra note 17, at 712-17. Mossoff cited nineteenth century cases in which patentees
were allowed to impose a variety of restrictions on the use of the property interest they conveyed to
licensees. Id at 714. Mossoff argued that by the end of the nineteenth century, it was well-settled
that patentees could convey lesser interests in their patents to licensees, who would take title to the
underlying patents "subject to a reverter in case of violation of the conditions of the sale." Id at 715
(quoting Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 290 (6th
Cir. 1896)).
21. John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer's Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant ofPatentExhaustion:An Avoidable
Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 245,259 n.84 (2008).
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parallels, this Article investigates the theoretical and policy justifications for the
doctrine. This Article argues that the correct rule on patent exhaustion should
be a "default-plus" rule, a rule that combines a default rule component with a pa-
tent misuse test that is independent of the exhaustion analysis. The default-rule
component allows patentees to avoid exhaustion through express patent restric-
tions, while the patent misuse test ensures that such restrictions do not violate
public policy.
This Article lays out the case that the default-plus rule is superior to the man-
datory rule in terms of theoretical foundation, malleability, and circumvention. As
for theoretical foundation, this Article rejects the prevailing justifications for
patent exhaustion and argues that the purpose of patent exhaustion is to re-
quire patentees to exercise their patent rights at the time of the sale of a pa-
tented article so as to protect and enable fair bargaining over the value of the
patented article. This purpose is served by a default rule and does not require a
mandatory rule. As for malleability, the mandatory rule of exhaustion is not flex-
ible enough and can only give legal effects to socially beneficial patent restrictions
in a haphazard way. As for circumvention, the formalistic nature of the manda-
tory rule of exhaustion creates more incentives for patentees to circumvent patent
exhaustion by adopting socially inefficient transaction forms or product designs.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, this Article combs through the
foundational cases of patent exhaustion and provides an overview of the manda-
tory rule and the default rule. Part II lays out the default-plus rule and explains
how it departs from the mandatory and default rules. The normative arguments
for the default-plus rule are presented in Part III.
I. CONFLICTING NOTIONS OF PATENT EXHAUSTION
The doctrine of patent exhaustion has had a long, tortuous history. Dur-
ing the one and a half centuries of its existence, courts have contrived patent ex-
haustion both as a mandatory rule and as a default rule, with starkly different
implications for patentees' rights.
A. The Mandatory Rule
The Supreme Court has routinely described patent exhaustion as a manda-
tory rule. In the foundational case of Bloomer v. McQuewan, the Supreme
Court rejected a patent assignee's efforts to prevent users of patented wood-
planing machines constructed during the patent's original term from continu-
128
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ing to use the machines during the patent's extended term. Chief Justice
Taney famously pronounced, "when the machine passes to the hands of the pur-
chaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly."23 This broad,
unqualified language is generally credited with giving birth to the exhaustion
doctrine,2 even though it is not clear whether Bloomer was truly decided on the
basis of patent exhaustion.
22. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). Bloomer involved rather complicated facts that were all but lost in
subsequent discussions of the case by courts and commentators. The underlying patent in Bloomer
was originally granted for a fourteen-year term expiring in 1842. Id at 547. The patent was
subsequently extended twice, first by a general act of Congress enacted in 1836, extending the
patent from 1842 to 1849, then by a private act of Congress enacted in 1845, extending the patent
from 1849 to 1856. Id During the patent's original term, the defendants were assigned the right
to construct and use a certain number of the patented machines during the remainder of the
original term in a territory that included Pittsburgh. Id at 555 (McLean, J., dissenting). During
the patent's first extended term, and after the passage of the 1845 private act authorizing the second
extension, the plaintiff was assigned the right to construct and use the patented machines during
the remainder of the first extended term and the entirety of the second extended term in a territory
that also included Pittsburgh. Id at 554-55. After the second extension of the patent took effect in
1849, the plaintiff brought a patent infringement suit against the defendants, who were continuing
to use two machines constructed during the patent's original term. Id at 555.
23. Id at 549 (majority opinion).
24. In Quanta Computer, Inc v. LGElec, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court cited Bloomer as the first
case in which the Court had applied the patent exhaustion doctrine. See 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
This view is generally shared by patent law scholars and practitioners. See, e.g, Erin Julia Daida
Austin, Reconciling the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional Sale Doctrines in Light of Quanta
Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2947, 2954-55 (2009); Andrew T.
Dufresne, The Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects of the Supreme
Court's Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 11, 12 (2009); Alfred C. Server & William J.
Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 561, 564-65 (2013); Tyler Thorp, Testing the Limits of Patent Exhaustions 'Authorized Sale"
Requirement Using Current High-Tech Licensing Practices, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1017, 1022
(2010).
25. It is not dear, however, whether Bloomer was truly decided on the basis of patent exhaustion. The
Court's holding in Bloomer was predicated upon a special provision in the general congressional act
of 1836 authorizing the first extension of the patent in question. That provision provided that the
benefits of the extension of the patent "shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to use the
thing patented, to the extent of their respective interests therein." Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at
541 (emphasis added). In an earlier case filed in the first extended term challenging the right of
similarly situated defendants to continue using the patented machines beyond the expiration of the
original term, the Supreme Court interpreted that special provision to "restore or save" to licensees,
who were using the patented machines at the time of the first extension, the right to continued use
of the machines, a right that, "without the clause, would have been vested again exclusively in the
patentee." Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 682 (1846). According to the Court in
Rousseau, but for this special provision, the new grant of exclusive rights under the 1836 act would
have encompassed "patented articles or machines throughout the country, purchased for practical
use in the business affairs of life .... " Id The Court in Bloomer held that the scope of a purchaser's
rights during the second extended term should be determined in reference to not only the 1845 act
authorizing the second extension, but also the "general laws" in force when the 1845 act was passed,
which included the 1836 act. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (4 How.) at 545-46. The Court further held that
because the 1836 act granted purchasers a continued use right, and because the 1845 act merely
63 UCLA L. REv. 122 (2016)
In 1873, in Adams v. Burke," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle it
laid out in Bloomer. Adams involved a patentee who assigned to the licensee the
patent rights for an improvement in coffin lids "for, to, and in" a geographical ar-
ea encircling Boston." The plaintiff was an assignee of the patentee's remainder
interest in the patent and brought an infringement suit against the defendant,
who purchased coffin lids from the licensee and used them in a town outside of
the area reserved for the licensee." Ruling in favor of the defendant, the Court
stated that "when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use
and he parts with the right to restrict that use."29 Then, citing Bloomer, the Court
held that "[tjhe article, in the language of the court, passes without the limit of
the monopoly."30
The Supreme Court's dedication to the mandatory patent exhaustion rule
did not stop afterAdams. In the 1895 case of Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 31
the Supreme Court again used broad, unqualified language in describing the
rights of the purchaser vis-i-vis the patentee. In Keeler, a patentee assigned pa-
tent rights for an improvement in folding beds to different persons in the states of
Massachusetts and Michigan.32 The assignee for Massachusetts brought a patent
infringement suit against the defendant who had purchased patented folding
beds from the assignee for Michigan and resold them in Massachusetts.33 Up-
holding the defendant's right to resell in Massachusetts, the Court stated that
"one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them
extended the term of the patent without altering the substantive rights conferred on purchasers by
the 1836 act, purchasers should be allowed to continue using previously constructed machines
during the second extended term. Id at 551. According to the Court in Bloomer, therefore, it was a
special congressional statute--not the inherent power of a sale-that exhausted the patentee's right
to control the continued use of previously constructed machines.
26. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
27. Id at 454.
28. Id It was not clear from the facts of the case where the sale of the coffin lids from the licensee
to the defendant took place. But given that there were no allegations that the licensee violated
its license terms, a reasonable assumption is that the sale took place within the area reserved for
the licensee.
29. 1d at 456.
30. Id at 456 &n.2. The Court, however, went on to state that "[w]hatever ... may be the rule when
patentees subdivide territorially their patents, . . . we hold that . . . when [the patented machines]
are once lawfilly made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the benefit of
the patentee or his assignees or licensees." Id at 456-57 (emphasis added). This language indicates
that the Court in Adams may have attached legal significance to the fact that no express restrictions
were imposed on the purchaser's use of the coffin lids.
31. 157 U.S. 659 (1895).




becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or
place."34 The patentee may be able to protect itself through an express contract
with the purchaser, but that, according to the Court, is a question under con-
tract law, not a question under patent law."
In 1912, the Supreme Court took patent exhaustion in a wholly different
direction in Henry v. AB. Dick, where the Court upheld a patentee's rights, under
patent law, to enforce a patent restriction requiring the patented machines to be
used only with supplies made by the patentee.36 The Court in AB. Dick inter-
preted Bloomer to stand only for the proposition that "a sale without reservations
of a machine whose value consists in its use, for a consideration, carries with it the
presumption that the right to use the particular machine is to pass with it."" The
Court made clear that the patentee could nonetheless avoid exhaustion by mak-
ing the sale subject to express restrictions, which would then reserve the uses not
permitted under the restrictions to the patentee." According to the Court, for a
limitation on the purchaser's right of use to be lawful, "the purchaser must have
notice that he buys with only a qualified right of use."3 9 As long as this require-
ment is met, the patentee would be accorded broad leeway in imposing "any
conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of
property."40 The rationale for this broad leeway was the "absolute freedom in
the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States."41
The Supreme Court's approach in AB. Dick turned out to be short-lived,
however. In 1913, in Bauer & Cie v. ODonnell, the Court refused to apply the
logic ofAB. Dick to a patent restriction attempting to fix the resale price of pa-
tented articles. 4 2 The Court held that AB. Dick involved the right to use the
34. M at 666.
35. M ("It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as
one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.").
36. 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
37. M at 23.
38. M at 24 ("But if the right of use be confined by specific restriction, the use not permitted is
necessarily reserved to the patentee.").
39. M at 26.
40. Id at 30.
41. Id at 29-30 (quoting E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'1 Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902)). Addi-
tionally, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly
or fix prices does not render them illegal." Id at 30. This made clear that the Court in AB. Dick
considered the specific license restriction in question-the tying of patented machines to supplies
necessary for their operation-to be within the broad leeway granted by patent law.
42. See 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
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patented invention,43 while Bauer involved the right to vend the patented in-
vention.44 In stark contrast to its holding in AB. Dick, the Court in Bauer held
that the patentee's attempt must fail because the right to vend as conferred by the
patent statute did not include a "grant of privilege to keep up prices and prevent
competition by notices restricting the price at which the article may be resold."45
Four years later, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled AB. Dick.46 In Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the owner of certain
patents for a motion picture projector attempted to enforce a patent restriction
requiring the patented projectors to be used solely for projecting a specific kind of
film manufactured by the patentee.4 The Supreme Court ruled for the defend-
ants on the ground that the restriction sought by the patentee was outside the
scope of its patent grant, which, according to the Court, was limited to "the
mechanism described in the patent as necessary to produce the described results"
and "[was] not concerned with and [had] nothing to do with the materials with
which or on which the machine operate[d]."4 Rejecting the patentee's bid to tie
the use of the patented projectors to the use of the unpatented films, the Court
stated that "[ijt is obvious that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are such
that the decision in Henry v. AB. Dick Co... . must be regarded as overruled."49
In 1940, in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court used
patent exhaustion to strike down a patentee's licensing scheme aimed at con-
43. Id. at 15 ("It was under the right to use that the license notice in question [in AB. Dick] was
sustained, and it is obvious that the notice in that case dealt with the use of the machine and limited
it to use only with the paper, ink, and supplies of the manufacture of the patentee.").
44. Id. at 16 ('The real question is whether, in the exclusive right secured by statute to 'vend' a
patented article there is included the right, by notice, to dictate the price at which subsequent sales
of the article may be made."). The Court considered it to be "a perversion of terms" to call the
transaction in Bauer a license to use the invention. Id.
45. Id at 17. The Court's stance in Bauer was consistent with its skepticism toward resale-price-
maintenance practices and reflected the prevailing view at the time that such practices violated
antitrust law and public policy. In a landmark case decided two years before Bauer, the Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court's holding that a minimum resale-price-maintenance scheme
instituted by a manufacturer violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
46. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
47. Id at 506. The patentee brought an infringement action against a third-party manufacturer who
sold noncompliant films to a user of the patented projector and against the user for using the
noncompliant films. Id at 508.
48. Id at 512.
49. Id at 518. It is not clear, however, whether the Court in Motion Picture Patents considered all
restrictions to be per se unlawfil, or only meant to say that the specific restriction at dispute (tying)
was unlawfil. All of the Court's analysis was specific to tying, and the Court cited Bauer for the
proposition that "the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale," suggesting that the
patentee may impose otherwise lawfil restrictions through a conditional sale. Id at 516 (emphasis
added).
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trolling the resale prices of the patented articles. 0 Ethyl Gasoline involved a pa-
tentee who held multiple patents including a patent for a fluid that could increase
fuel efficiency, a patent for a motor fuel produced by mixing gasoline with the pa-
tented fluid, and a patent for a method of using fuel containing the patented fluid
in combustion motors." The patentee sold only the patented fluid, but required
refiners who purchased the fluid to sell finished gasoline products containing the
fluid only to jobbers licensed by the patentee." In deciding who were to be
granted licenses, the patentee had a long-standing practice of excluding jobbers
who cut prices or refused to conform to the marking policies or posted prices of
the major refineries." The U.S. government challenged the patentee's licensing
scheme as an unlawful restraint of interstate commerce.54 The Supreme Court
agreed with the government, holding that the patentee could not, by virtue of its
patent, condition its license "so as to control conduct by the licensee not em-
braced in the patent monopoly, ... or upon the maintenance of resale prices by
the purchaser of the patented article."" The authorized sale of the fuel by refin-
ers to jobbers, said the Court, exhausted the patent monopoly over the fuel and
the patentee could not rely on its patent to control the price at which the fuel
could be resold. 6
In 1942, in United States v. Uniris Lens Co., the Supreme Court again used
patent exhaustion to block a patentee's efforts to enforce a patent restriction on
the resale prices of the patented articles." In Univis, the holder of certain patents
for multifocal lenses licensed a manufacturing licensee to manufacture and sell
lens blanks to designated wholesalers and retailers for finishing and resale, at pric-
es specified by the patentee, for use in eyeglasses." The U.S. government sued
the patentee for unlawful restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.59 The Court
held that although the lens blanks sold to the wholesalers and retailers were not
themselves patented, the sale nonetheless exhausted the patentee's patents on
the finished lenses because the lens blanks "embodi[ed] essential features of the
patented device and [were] without utility until ... ground and polished as the
50. 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
51. Id at 446.
52. Id at 459. Ajobber is an individual or company that buys gasoline from refiners for resale to retailers
and consumers. See United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp. 959, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
53. 309 U.S. at 450.
54. Id
55. Id at 456-57.
56. M at 457. The Court also held that the sale of the fluid additive to the refiners exhausted the
patentee's exclusive right to use the patented fluid. Id
57. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
58. Id at 243-44.
59. Id at 241.
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finished lens of the patent."60 Because the patent law did not protect the price-
fixing features of the patentee's licensing system, the Court held, those features
violated the Sherman Act by eliminating competition in interstate commerce.1
Finally, in 2008, in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the principle of patent exhaustion and extended it to
method patents. In Quanta, LG Electronics (LGE) licensed Intel to make, use,
and sell microprocessors and chipsets practicing several of LGE's method patents
relating to computer memory processing.63 However, LGE required computer
makers who purchased Intel's microprocessors and chipsets practicing LGE's pa-
tents to have separate licenses from LGE.64 LGE brought a patent infringement
suit against Quanta, who purchased microprocessors and chipsets from Intel and
assembled them into computers without a license. 5 After recounting the long
history of patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court rejected LGE's argument that
patent exhaustion did not apply to method claims an argument the Court charac-
terized as an end run around patent exhaustion.66 The Court further held that
Intel's sale of the microprocessors and chipsets triggered patent exhaustion be-
cause those products substantially embodied LGE's patents. 7
B. The Default Rule
The Supreme Court's embrace of the mandatory rule of exhaustion has
not been consistent, however. Not counting A.B. Dick, which was overruled by
Motion Picture Patents," the Supreme Court has broken away from the manda-
60. Id at 249. In so holding, the Court assumed that the patents in question were practiced in part by
the wholesalers and retailers who ground the blanks into lenses. See id at 248-49.
61. Id at 252.
62. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). A method patent, or a process patent, is a patent that outlines a procedure for
producing a physical result independent of the producing mechanism. Thomson Machinery Co. v.
Larose, 197 F. Supp. 636, 641 (E.D. La. 1961).
63. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 622-23.
64. In its license agreement with Intel, LGE made clear that its license did not grant the right for third
parties to combine the microprocessors and chipsets with non-Intel products. Id at 624. In a
separate agreement, Intel agreed to give written notice to its customers informing them that they
did not have LGE's permission to combine the microprocessors and chipsets with non-Intel
components. Id at 623-24.
65. Id
66. Id at 624-25.
67. Id at 631 ('We agree with Quanta that Univis governs this case. As the Court there explained,
exhaustion was triggered by the sale of the lens blanks because their only reasonable and intended
use was to practice the patent and because they 'embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented
invention.' Each of those attributes is shared by the microprocessors and chipsets Intel sold to
Quanta under the Licensing Agreement.") (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
68. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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tory rule and upheld patentees' rights under patent law to enforce patent re-
strictions against purchasers on two separate occasions. Taking advantage of this
inconsistency, the Federal Circuit has interpreted patent exhaustion as a default
rule that applies only in unconditional sales.
The first occasion on which the Supreme Court upheld a patent restriction
on purchasers was the 1872 case of Mitchellv. Hawley.69 In Mitchell, the owner of
a patent covering a machine for making felt hats granted a licensee the exclusive
right "to make and use, and to license to others the right to use the said machines
in the States of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, ... during the remainder of
the original term of said letters-patent."o Unlike the license in Bloomer, the li-
cense in Mitchell explicitly stated that it conferred no rights beyond the expiration
of the patent's original term." But when the licensee manufactured four patented
machines and sold them to the defendant purchasers, the license granted by the
licensee to the defendants omitted any references to the time limitation in the
original license. The patent term was subsequently extended, and the patentee's
assignee for the extended term brought an infringement suit against the defend-
ants who were continuing to use, during the extended term, the machines they
purchased during the original term."
In an about-face from the outcome in Bloomer, the Supreme Court in
Mitchell held that the defendants' continued use of the patented machines dur-
ing the patent's extended term constituted infringement.4 The Court stated that
the purchaser of a patented machine for the purpose of using it in the ordinary
pursuits of life acquires a "complete tide" to the machine, unburdened by the lim-
its of the patent monopoly." This rule was "well settled," when "the sale is abso-
lute, and without any conditions."6 But since the patentee in this case expressly
69. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872).
70. Id at 545.
71. Id ("Provided, that the said [licensee] shall not in any way or form dispose of, sell, or grant any
license to use the said machines beyond the 3d day of May, A.D. 1867.").
72. The license to the defendant only provided that it would allow the defendant to use the machines
in the town of Haverhill, Massachusetts, under the patentee's patent bearing the date of May 3,
1864. See id at 546.
73. Id at 549.
74. Id at 550-51.
75. Id at 548 ("Complete title to the implement or machine purchased becomes vested in the vendee
by the sale and purchase, but he acquires no portion of the franchise, as the machine, when it
rightfully passes from the patentee to the purchaser, ceases to be within the limits of the
monopoly.").
76. Id ("Sales of the kind may be made by the patentee with or without conditions, as in other cases,
but where the sale is absolute, and without any conditions, the rule is well settled that the purchaser
may continue to use the implement or machine purchased until it is worn out, or he may repair it or
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restricted the rights being granted to the licensee to those for the remainder of the
patent's original term, the Court held that the patentee did not forego its rights
for the extended term." The purchaser did not need to have notice of the patent
restriction, because "no one can convey ... any better title than he owns" (nemo
dat quod non habet) and "the law imposes the risk upon the purchaser, as against
the real owner, whether the title of the seller is such that he can make a valid con-
veyance."
The second occasion on which the Supreme Court upheld a patent re-
striction on purchasers was the 1937 case of General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co.79 In that case, the owner of patents covering an amplifier
used in telephones, radios, and other public address systems licensed its patents to
different licensees to manufacture and sell the patented amplifiers in different
fields. 0 One licensee, who was only licensed to manufacture and sell the amplifi-
ers for private use, knowingly sold some of them to the defendant for commercial
use while the defendant had actual knowledge of the fact that the licensee had no
license to make such sales." The patentee sued the defendant for using the am-
plifiers for commercial purposes, alleging patent infringement." In defense, the
defendant resorted to the mandatory rule of exhaustion, arguing that "[tjhe own-
er of a patent cannot, by means of the patent, restrict the use made of a device
manufactured under the patent after the device has passed into the hands of a
purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade and full consideration paid therefor.""
The Court rejected this argument. Citing Mitchell, the Court stated that the li-
censee "could not convey to [the purchaser] what both knew it was not author-
ized to sell."84 The Court held that because the sale made by the licensee to the
improve upon it as he pleases, in same manner as if dealing with property of any other kind.")
(emphasis added).
77. Id at 549-51. The Court emphasized that it was expressly stipulated in the instrument of
conveyance that the licensee "shall not, in any way, or form, dispose of, sell, or grant any license to
use the said machines beyond the expiration' of the original term." Id at 549.
78. Id at 550 ("Persons . . . who buy goods from one not the owner, and who does not lawfully
represent the owner, however innocent they may be, obtain no property whatever in the goods, as
no one can convey in such a case any better title than he owns, unless the sale is made in market
overt, or under circumstances which show that the seller lawfully represented the owner.").
79. 304 U.S. 175 (1937), reh'granted, 304 U.S. 587, affdon rehg, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
80. Id at 179.
81. Id at 179-80. Pursuant to a license requirement, the licensee affixed a notice to all amplifiers it
manufactured and sold, stating that the amplifiers were to be used for private use only. Id at 180.
82. Id at 179.
83. Id at 180.
84. Id at 181 (citing Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872)). This characterization of
Mitchell, however, was not accurate, as Mitchell did not attach any significance to the purchaser's
knowledge of limitations on the rights of use it acquired. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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defendant was outside the scope of the licensee's license and both parties knew
that fact, the defendant was not a "purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade.""
In 1992, in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit substan-
tially broadened the rule in General Talking Pictures and explicitly declared patent
exhaustion as a default rule applying to unconditional sales only." The plaintiff
in Mallinckrodt attempted to enforce a "single use only" restriction inscribed on a
patented medical device against a servicer who retrofitted the devices for multiple
uses by hospitals." Adopting the mandatory rule of exhaustion, the court below
held that the plaintiff s attempt must fail because "no restriction whatsoever could
be imposed under the patent law."" On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the
plaintiff characterized the "single use only" restriction it was trying to enforce
as a field-of-use restriction, in an apparent effort to invoke the permissive rule
for field-of-use restrictions under General Talking Pictures.8 9
The Federal Circuit, however, went beyond General Talking Pictures in rul-
ing for the plaintiff. It held that General Talking Pictures did not address the spe-
cific situation involved in the instant case, where "the patentee was the manufac-
manufacturer and the device reached a purchaser in ordinary channels of trade." 90
It instead cited earlier Supreme Court cases on patent exhaustion to support the
plaintiff s infringement claim. After summarizing the Supreme Court's rulings in
Bloomer, Mitchell, Adams, and Keeler, the Federal Circuit concluded that those
earlier cases "do not stand for the proposition that no restriction or condition may
be placed upon the sale of a patented article."91 Rather, in the view of the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court in those cases "simply applied, to a variety of factual
situations, the rule of contract law that sale may be conditioned."92 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that since the patent law grants a patentee the right to exclude
others from making, selling, or using the invention altogether, a patentee can
choose to waive the right of exclusion "in whole or in part."93 In other words, a
patentee has the freedom of alienating less than full property interests in its pa-
tent rights, as long as it makes explicit the scope of the property interests being
alienated. The Federal Circuit finally held that if the "single use only' notice in-
scribed on the devices constituted a valid condition of sale, then violation of the
85. Id at 180-81.
86. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
87. Id at 701.
88. Id
89. Id at 703. The permitted field-of-use here, the plaintiff argued, was single or disposable use. Id
90. Id at 705.
91. Id at 708.
92. Id
93. Id at 703.
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restriction may be remedied by action for patent infringement as long as such re-
striction was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified.94
The Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Quanta has cast doubt on the con-
tinued validity of the default rule articulated in Mallinckrodt. In Quanta, the Su-
preme Court held that LGE's method patents were exhausted upon the sale of
microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodying the patents despite the fact
that LGE made it clear in its license agreement with Intel that its license did not
grant the right for third parties to combine the microprocessors and chipsets with
non-Intel products.95 The Quanta case, however, did not explicitly address the
broader question of whether patentees could ever bypass patent exhaustion
through a conditional sale,96 leaving ample room for disagreements as to whether
the Mallinckrodt default rule is still good law.97
94. Id at 709. The Federal Circuit did not decide whether the "single use only" notice was legally
sufficient to constitute a license or condition of sale, because it was reviewing an appeal of the
district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment and the district court did not address
that question in its ruling. See id at 701. The district court only held that no restrictions could be
imposed under patent law whether or not the notice was sufficient. Id
95. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
96. Austin, supra note 24, at 2953. The Quanta case could be read narrowly as only holding that the
sale in question in Quanta was not a conditional sale. Id at 2967.
97. Some commentators argue that Quanta effectively overruled Mallinckrodt. See, e.g, Herbert
Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Alvi. L. 487, 502 (2011) ("In its 2008 Quanta decision the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit's approach [in Mallinckrodt] and restored the first sale rule
to its original broad scope."); Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court's
Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 529-530 (2009) ("A
carefil examination of the manner in which the Quanta case was litigated and decided ... indicates
that there is no longer any room for continued adherence to the Mallinckrodt line of cases."); Chris
Holman, Quanta and Its Impact on Biotechnology, HOLMAN'S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June 11, 2008,
2:57 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/quanta-andits-impact-on-
biotechnology.html [http://perma.cc/F2K7-4WY2] ("[I]t appears to me that Quanta implicitly
overrules Mallinckrodt. . . ."). But some commentators are of the view that Quanta left the default
rule intact. See, e.g, Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit's Licensing LazoJurisprudence: Its
Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 236 (2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's reversal in
Quanta Computer ... amounts to an affirmation of the Federal Circuit's basic approach to patent
exhaustion in the Mallinckrodt line of cases."); William LaFuze et al., The Conditional Sale Doctrine
in a Post-Quanta Worldand Its Implications on Modern LicensingAgreements, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L.295, 317 (2011) ("In failing to mention the Mallinckrodt case and the conditional
sale doctrine in the Quanta opinion, the Supreme Court left the status of the conditional sale
doctrine unclear. Several ways of reconciling the opinion with the doctrine exist .... Ultimately,
leaving the scope of the conditional sale doctrine intact is the best way for courts to 'promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and the usefil [a]rts."') (alterations in original); see also JAY DRATLER, JR.,
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.05 ("[Wlhether Mallinckrodt survives [Quanta]
is an open question.").
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II. PATENT EXHAUSTION ASA DEFAULT-PLUS RULE
The previous Part recounts two starkly different approaches to patent ex-
haustion: The mandatory rule of exhaustion would extinguish all patent re-
strictions on the purchaser, including those explicitly imposed by the patentee as
a condition of sale, while the default rule of exhaustion would only extinguish pa-
tent restrictions that are not a condition of sale. Both rules have support in case
law, which is growing increasingly inconsistent as courts struggle with the two
conflicting notions of patent exhaustion.
This Article departs from the current literature by moving beyond the pre-
sent state of the law and exploring what the patent exhaustion rule should be.
This Article puts forward an alternative rule-a "default-plus" rule-that com-
bines the default rule with a patent misuse test independent of the exhaustion
analysis. Following discussions of how this default-plus rule differs from the
mandatory rule and the default rule in this Part, the next Part lays out the ar-
guments for why the default-plus rule is the correct rule from a normative point
of view.
To start, it is instructive to note that patent exhaustion is a doctrine that in-
validates patent restrictions imposed on purchasers. By extinguishing all patent
restrictions upon sale, the mandatory rule of exhaustion essentially treats all pa-
tent restrictions on purchasers as per se unlawful. Under this approach, it is not
necessary to assess the lawfulness of a specific patent restriction on purchasers on
its own merit that inquiry is avoided by a blanket prohibition of all patent re-
strictions on purchasers. But the primary reason why a court may want to employ
the mandatory rule is still based on a judgment that the specific patent restriction
at issue violates public policy. In Bauer, for example, the Supreme Court used pa-
tent exhaustion to pass judgment on the lawfulness of resale price maintenance.9 8
In Motion Picture Patents, the Court used patent exhaustion to reject the patent-
ee's tying of patented motion picture projectors to unpatented films.99 In both
cases, the Court appeared to be motivated by what it saw as the inconsistency of
the specific patent restriction in question with public policy and resorted to patent
exhaustion as a way of disapproving the restriction.00
But mandatory patent exhaustion is not the only way to reject a patent re-
striction as against public policy. Instead of declaring all patent restrictions on
98. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
100. Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt argued that the district court's holding in that case
that the "single use only" restriction in question was unenforceable was based on "policy
considerations." See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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purchasers as per se unlawful under the name of patent exhaustion, an alternative
approach would be to evaluate the specific restriction in a separate inquiry to de-
termine whether it comports with public policy on its own merits. To the extent
that such a stand-alone public policy analysis is informed by the same policy con-
siderations as those evaluated under the mandatory exhaustion rule, it would pro-
duce the same outcomes in specific cases. In Bauer, for example, the restriction at
issue minimum resale price maintenance was considered a per se violation of
public policy as reflected in antitrust law under the legal standard prevailing at the
time.0 ' The Supreme Court could have limited its holding in Bauer to one de-
claring that minimum resale price maintenance for patented articles violates anti-
trust law, without resorting to a blanket prohibition of all patent restrictions on
purchasers.0 2 In Motion Picture Patents, the patented motion picture projectors
were the only type with which the unpatented films could be used successfiully,103
meaning that the patentee had a virtual monopoly in the market for motion pic-
ture projectors. The patentee's tying of patented projectors to unpatented films,
therefore, would have violated the prohibition of anticompetitive tying under an-
titrust law.104 Conversely, the Supreme Court's refusal in A.B. Dicks to apply pa-
tent exhaustion appears to have been motivated by its belief that the patented
machine in question was just one of many similar products on the market and the
101. Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1913) (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)). The legal treatment of minimum resale price maintenance has
since evolved. Today, the practice is subject to a rule of reason analysis. See Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
102. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Bauer was indeed
limited to minimum resale price maintenance. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704 ("These cases
established that price-fixing and tying restrictions accompanying the sale of goods were per se
illegal. These cases did not hold, and it did not follow, that all restrictions accompanying the sale of
patented goods were deemed illegal."). To the extent that the Supreme Court did limit its holding
in such a fashion, it certainly did not do so explicitly.
103. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 508 (1917).
104. Under antitrust law, a tying arrangement is considered per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act if the following conditions are met: 1) There are
separate tying and tied products; 2) there is evidence of actual coercion by the seller that in fact
forced the buyer to accept the tied product; 3) the seller possesses sufficient economic power in the
tying product market to coerce purchaser acceptance of the tied product; 4) there are
anticompetitive effects in the tied market; and, 5) there is involvement of a not insubstantial
amount of interstate commerce in the tied product market. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 397 (3d ed.
2005). The market power requirement for a finding of illegal tying would have been easily met in
Motion Picture Patents as the patentee had a monopoly in the market for the tying product
(projectors).
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patentee's practice of tying its use to the use of unpatented inks would cause no
harm to the public.05
One historical factor that led the Supreme Court to use mandatory patent
exhaustion to reject patent restrictions that would have been unlawful under anti-
trust law was the perceived conflict between patent law and antitrust law. 06 Be-
cause of the notion that the patent monopoly authorized by the Constitution
required "absolute freedom" in the use or sale of patent rights, courts struggled in
defining the boundary between the permissible patent monopoly and the mo-
nopoly that would be condemned by antitrust law. 0 ' One convenient way of re-
solving the perceived conflict between patent law and antitrust law was to declare
the patent monopoly to have been exhausted so that there would be no impedi-
ments to the full application of antitrust law. In Univis, for example, the Su-
preme Court declared the patentee's patent rights to have been exhausted upon
the sale of the lens blanks before it held that the patentee's attempt to control the
resale prices of the finished lenses violated the Sherman Act.08
Yet there are no principled reasons why antitrust law should be applied in
these cases only after patent rights have been exhausted. In Motion Picture Pa-
tents, the appeals court below relied solely on the Clayton Act, which prohibits
anticompetitive tying even when it involves patented articles,109 in striking down
105. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 34 (1912) ("[Tlhe public is always free to take or refuse the
patented article on the terms imposed. If they be too onerous or not in keeping with the benefits,
the patented article will not find a market.").
106. In the first twenty years after the 1890 enactment of the Sherman Act, courts tended to defer to the
prerogatives of intellectual property right holders when their licensing restrictions were challenged
under the Sherman Act. See Willard K. Tom & Joshua A Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual
Property: From Separate Spheres to UnifiedField, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 168-70 (1997). Between
1912 and the mid-1970s, however, courts generally perceived patent law and antitrust law as rigidly
separate spheres of law. See id at 170-73.
107. Id The Court inAB. Dick, for example, justified its approval of the patent restriction at issue by
referring to this "absolute freedom" in the use or sale of patent rights. See AB. Dick, 224 U.S. at
29-30 ("[T]he general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of
the United States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions,
that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the
article, will be upheld by the courts.") (quoting E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S.
70, 91 (1902)).
108. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942) ("The price fixing features of
appellees' licensing system, which are not within the protection of the patent law, violate the
Sherman Act....").
109. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof... on the
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
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the patentee's tying restriction."' The Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents
pointed out that its reliance on patent exhaustion made it unnecessary to apply
the Clayton Act,"' but the Court did not rule that it would have been inappro-
priate to rely on the Clayton Act directly." Even when there are no statutes like
the Clayton Act on point, courts could still interpret the patent monopoly in a
manner that does not give patentees the power to use their patents in violation
of public policy goals reflected in antitrust law. This principle has long been
recognized by modern antitrust jurisprudence, which treats intellectual property
as essentially comparable to any other form of property for antitrust purposes.113
If one takes the view that a patent restriction may violate public policy even
if it does not violate antitrust law,114 it is also clear that a rejection of a patent re-
striction on public policy grounds does not require the application of mandatory
patent exhaustion. Courts could conduct a public policy test for the patent re-
striction even when the patentee is still theoretically protected by its patent rights.
Such public policy tests are routinely conducted under the patent misuse doc-
trine, an equitable doctrine that holds a patent unenforceable, but not void, if it
is being used in violation of the public policy behind the patent monopoly.11s
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012))
(emphasis added).
110. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 235 F. 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1916) ("If the
prohibitions of the Clayton Act mean anything at all, this case falls within them, and the
restrictions as to use of flms other than complainant's with the projecting machines are therefore
void.").
111. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917) ("Our
conclusion renders it unnecessary to make the application of this statute to the case at bar which the
Circuit Court of Appeals made of it. . . .").
112. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that that the Clayton Act was "a most persuasive
expression of the public policy of our country with respect to the question before us," hinting that
its decision to apply patent exhaustion was informed by the same public policy underlying the
Clayton Act. Id at 517-18.
113. This view is one of the principles underlying the 1995 Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property issued by the U.S. Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission. See Tom &
Newberg, supra note 106, at 173.
114. See, e.g., Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892-93 (D. Mass.
1980), affd, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that less evidence of an anticompetitive effect is
required to show patent misuse than to show an antitrust violation).
115. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457,465 (1957) ("[C]ourts will not aid a
patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the
period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or 'purged' as
the conventional saying goes.").
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Indeed, in the very first case that laid out the patent misuse doctrine, Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the Supreme Court rejected a tying restriction on public
policy grounds without even discussing patent exhaustion."'
In sum, mandatory patent exhaustion is not the only way to reject a patent
restriction as violating public policy. This Article proposes a modified rule of ex-
haustion that, like in Morton Salt, conducts a patent misuse test independent of
the exhaustion analysis. This modified rule of exhaustion would preserve patent
exhaustion as a default rule, requiring exhaustion only when the patentee has not
subjected the sale to express patent restrictions. When an express patent restric-
tion survives a sale under the default rule, a separate patent misuse test will be
conducted to determine whether the patentee could enforce the specific patent
restriction in light of public policy considerations. This Article refers to this
modified rule of exhaustion as the "default-plus" rule, with the word "plus" re-
flecting the addition of the stand-alone patent misuse test. If the mandatory rule
of exhaustion could be described as a per se rule that automatically rejects all pa-
tent restrictions on purchasers, the proposed default-plus rule would be a "rule of
reason" that evaluates patent restrictions in explicitly conditional sales on a case-
by-case basis. The stand-alone patent misuse test provides a vehicle through
which to conduct this case-by-case inquiry.
It bears noting that the patent misuse test as currently applied is not with-
out ambiguities. Under current case law, it is unclear what public policy factors go
into the patent misuse analysis. When the Supreme Court developed the patent
misuse doctrine in Morton Salt, the Court made clear that a patent restriction did
not have to violate antitrust law to violate broader public policy."' But the Court
did not specify the content of that broader public policy. Since the 1980s, the
Federal Circuit has tried to put some rationality into the patent misuse doctrine by
limiting its use to situations where a patent restriction raises antitrust concerns.1
116. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942). Morton Salt involved a
patentee leasing its patented salt-depositing machines on the condition that such machines be used
only with salt tablets sold by the patentee. Id at 491. The case did not involve patent exhaustion
because there were no sales of patented articles. But that did not prevent the Supreme Court from
holding that the patentee's tying restriction violated public policy and constituted patent misuse. See
id at 494 ("It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successfUl infringement suit, in
conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit....").
117. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 ("It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the
Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain
petitioner's manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy....").
118. In 1986, in Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., the Federal Circuit required a patent restriction to
cause an "anticompetitive effect" for it to constitute patent misuse. 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (1986)
('The doctrine of patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a suit for patent infringement ... and
requires that the alleged infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical
or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.") (citation omitted) (citing
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This narrowing of the patent misuse doctrine, however, is at odds with the Su-
preme Court's expansive formulation of the doctrine.119
Without clear guidance on what public policy factors should be considered
under the patent misuse doctrine, the doctrine is at the risk of becoming a circular
exercise.120 Such circularity is on vivid display when courts hold that a patent re-
striction violates public policy and therefore is unenforceable when the patent
owner knows it is unenforceable.121 In the patent exhaustion context, an open-
ended patent misuse test would deprive the default-plus rule of the clarity it
otherwise would bring to the patent exhaustion jurisprudence. Under an open-
ended patent misuse test, while patentees would be able to predict whether a pa-
tent restriction would survive exhaustion, they would not be able to predict
whether it would survive the subsequent public policy test.
For the sake of legal certainty, therefore, a complete overhaul of the patent
exhaustion doctrine requires the narrowing of the patent misuse test to one in-
formed by predictable logic. One potential way to find such predictable logic is to
look to antitrust law, whose large body of case law offers relatively coherent prin-
ciples. Scholars have advocated that to the extent that public policy concerns
about a patent restriction are motivated by its anticompetitive effects, such con-
cerns should be addressed under antitrust principles.' Restricting the patent
misuse test to antitrust considerations, in cases where the alleged misuse stems
from anticompetitive effects of a patent restriction, would enable both patentees
and licensees to develop informed expectations-with guidance from antitrust
case law-as to whether the patent restriction would be legal. In the meantime,
the patent misuse test may protect other values that are not fully captured by
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of 111. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)). This
requirement continued to be imposed in subsequent cases. See Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and
Fall?) ofthe Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 669, 679-82 (2001).
119. See Hoerner, supra note 118, at 684-85.
120. See Mark R. Patterson, LeveragingInformationAboutPatents: Settlements, Por folios, andHoldups, 50
HOUS. L. REV. 483, 500 (2012) ("[T]he scope argument in this context is entirely circular. Ifthe
patent is valid, an agreement that delays entry of a competitor that uses the patented technology is
within the scope of the patent, but validity is exactly the issue on which legality of the agreement
turns, so relying on scope is assuming the result of the argument.") (emphasis in original).
121. See, e.g, A.G. Design & Assocs., LLC v. Trainman Lantern Co., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1279
(W.D. Wash. 2008) ("A patent is unenforceable for misuse when its owner attempts to use it to
exclude competition knowing that the patent is invalid or unenforceable. For a patent to become
unenforceable, the patent owner must both have an unenforceable patent and know the patent
is unenforceable.") (citations omitted).
122. See, e.g, Hovenkamp, supra note 104, at 242-45. Hovenkamp rejects the notion that there are two
standards for identifying anticompetitive acts, one embodied in the antitrust laws and another
embodied in the Patent Act. Id
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competition concerns.12 In such cases, the need for predictable logic counsels for
clearly spelling out what those values are. An example of what not to do in such
cases is provided in Quanta, where the Supreme Court's rejection of the defend-
ant's patent restriction appears to have been motivated by the Court's disapproval
of the defendant's licensing practice.124 Instead of articulating the public policy
objection to the defendant's licensing practice, the Court disposed of the matter
under the name of mandatory patent exhaustion with no clear guidance for
commentators and future litigants."'
Regardless of the specifics of the public policy test under a default-plus re-
gime, the larger point this Article attempts to make is that any evaluations of the
public policy implications of patent restrictions on purchasers ought to be con-
ducted on a case-by-case basis outside of the patent exhaustion analysis. In other
words, the sale of a patented article does not per se exhaust patent rights with re-
spect to the sold article. This essentially reconceptualizes patent exhaustion from
a per se rule to a rule of reason. For normative reasons discussed in Part III, the
proper role of the patent exhaustion doctrine itself ought to be limited to exhaust-
ing a patentee's rights with respect to a sold patented article when, and only
when, the patentee did not exercise its rights through express restrictions im-
posed at the time of the sale.
In fairness, the default rule envisioned by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt
includes a public policy test. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt stated that vio-
lations of a patent restriction may be remedied by action for patent infringement
as long as such restriction was "within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise
justified."2 6 Courts, however, often pay lip service to this public policy test. In
Quanta, for example, the patentee-LGE-was trying to enforce a patent re-
striction precluding third-party computer makers from using the microprocessors
and chipsets sold by Intel.' In so doing, LGE was essentially trying to exact a
second royalty payment from third-party computer makers when it had already
123. Id; see also Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003) (arguing that antitrust analysis is insufficient for patent misuse);
Elizabeth A- Rowe, Patents, Genetically ModifiedFoods, andlP Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. 859,
888-90 (2011) (proposing a patent overreach doctrine to protect researchers' access to patented
genetically modified products).
124. See F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting
Options Offthe Table?, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315,316 (2008) ("[T]he true import of the case
is the way it speaks about what patent contracting can be done as a matter of Court-created policy
for federal patent law.").
125. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
126. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
127. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for discussions of Quanta.
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received a royalty payment from Intel.' Applying the Mallinckrodt default rule,
the Federal Circuit in Quanta held that LGE should be allowed to enforce its li-
cense restriction because patent exhaustion did not apply to an expressly condi-
tional sale.129 At no point did the Federal Circuit discuss whether LGE's license
restriction violated public policy.130
Applying the default-plus rule proposed in this Article to the Broadcom-
Qualcomm dispute discussed above will help illuminate the differences be-
tween the proposed rule and the existing mandatory and default rules. Under
the default-plus rule, Qualcomm's double royalty scheme would not be per se il-
legal like it was under the mandatory rule of exhaustion. Nor would Qualcomm's
scheme be per se legal like it was under the default rule. The resolution of the
Broadcom-Qualcomm dispute would depend on whether a court considers
Qualcomm's double royalty scheme to be in violation of public policy. Under the
default-plus rule, this public policy analysis will be an inquiry separate from, not
part of, the patent exhaustion doctrine. If this public policy analysis is to be fur-
ther limited to the impact of Qualcomm's practice on competition, the legal anal-
ysis of the Broadcom-Qualcomm dispute would boil down to a much more
predictable analysis of the legality of Qualcomm's double royalty scheme under
antitrust law. In 1998, a federal court held that a double royalty scheme similar to
Qualcomm's constituted patent misuse because it imposed an unreasonable re-
straint on competition.131 Under this standard, Qualcomm's double royalty
scheme might be rejected as being anticompetitive. Qualcomm's likely defeat
under this analysis, however, would be because its double royalty scheme failed
the public policy test, not because its patent rights were automatically cut off up-
on the authorized sale of the patented chipsets. A holding that Qualcomm's
double royalty scheme is illegal, therefore, would not necessarily jeopardize patent
licensing practices that involve patent restrictions on purchasers but do not in-
volve the collection of double royalties.132
128. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 97 (noting that LGE's license restriction in Quanta served as a notice
to third-party computer makers that they needed to purchase a license from LGE).
129. LG Elec., Inc. v. Bizcom Elec., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The 'exhaustion
doctrine . . . does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license,' . . . so LGE's rights in
asserting infringement of its system claims were not exhausted.") (citing B. Braun Med., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
130. See id at 1369-70.
131. See PSC Inc. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510-11 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a
licensor misused its patents by charging royalties for laser scan engines used in laser detectors, and
charging a second royalty to another licensee when engines were installed in detection services).
132. For one example of such licensing practices, see the licensing structure employed by MPEG-2. See
infa notes200-04 and accompanying text.
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III. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR THE DEFAULT-PLUS RULE
The main thrust of the default-plus rule developed in Part II is two-fold.
First, patent exhaustion should be a treated as a default rule. Namely, it should
only invalidate a patent restriction that is not expressly imposed on the purchaser
at the time of the sale. Second, the default rule should be coupled with a patent
misuse test that is separate from the exhaustion analysis. Unlike the mandatory
rule of exhaustion, this default-plus rule of exhaustion allows patentees to reserve
patent rights against purchasers through express restrictions, provided that such
restrictions pass the patent misuse test.
This Part presents the normative case for why the default-plus rule is supe-
rior to the mandatory rule of exhaustion. The normative case revolves around
three arguments: Compared to the mandatory rule, the default-plus rule (i)
stands on a firmer theoretical foundation, (ii) is more malleable in giving effects
to socially beneficial patent restrictions, and (iii) creates fewer incentives for
wasteful circumvention efforts.
A. Theoretical Foundation
Although patent exhaustion has been routinely described as a manda-
tory rule, no satisfactory explanations exist as to why there should be an
across-the-board prohibition of patent restrictions on purchasers from the
standpoint of legal theory. By contrast, a strong argument could be made that
patent exhaustion has its purpose in protecting and enabling fair bargaining be-
tween the seller and the buyer over the value of the patented article. This ra-
tionale only requires patent exhaustion to be a default rule, not a mandatory rule.
1. The Mandatory Rule
Despite the Supreme Court's frequent invocation of the mandatory rule of
exhaustion,133 the theoretical justification for the mandatory rule has been unclear
at best. The only rationale offered by the Supreme Court for patent exhaustion
first articulated in Mitchell v. Hawley in 1873 and dutifully repeated thereafter is
the idea that a patentee is entitled to only one reward that has to be realized in the
form of the sale price of the patented article when it is first sold.134 Under this
133. See supra Part I.A.
134. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1873) ("[W]hen [patentees] have made one
or more of the things patented, and have vended the same to others to be used, they have parted to
that extent with their exclusive right, as they are never entitled to but one royalty for a patented
machine . . . ."); see, e.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) ("[T]he patentee or
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"single reward" theory, a patentee loses its patent rights with respect to a sold arti-
cle after it has collected its rewards from the sale of the article.
As Glen Robinson has pointed out, however, this single reward theory begs
the question ofwhy a patentee should be required to collect its rewards all at once
when the patented article is first sold.135 According to Robinson, the single re-
ward theory calls for a constraint not just on the total amount of the rewards from
a patent, but also on how the rewards are structured.136 Robinson argued that
even under the assumption that a patent represents a monopoly and therefore the
total amount of the rewards to the patentee needs to be capped at no greater than
is necessary to fulfill the special purposes of the patent grant, the single reward
theory still cannot be justified because "the patent law does not prescribe a fixed
schedule of allowable returns from the patent or the form in which they can be re-
ceived."137
The single reward theory becomes somewhat more sensible when the theo-
ry is viewed in light of common law's traditional hostility to servitudes on chat-
tels.138 Scholars including Robinson and Molly Van Houweling have discussed
patent exhaustion in the context of common law's refusal to recognize chattel ser-
vitudes, suggesting a link between the two.1 39 If the courts were reluctant to en-
force servitudes on chattels as a matter of general property law, the logic goes, it
seems natural for them to take a skeptical stance towards servitudes on chattels
embodying patents and other intellectual property rights.140
his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the
use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees."); see also United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) ("[Tlhe purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with
respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of his
invention by the sale of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law affords
no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.").
135. Robinson, supra note 17, at 1465.
136. Id. at 1496.
137. Id. Note that modern antitrust law does not take the view that a patent necessarily represents a
monopoly. See, e.g., Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill.
2003) ("A patent confers a monopoly in the sense of a right to exclude others from selling the
patented product. But if there are close substitutes for the patented product, the patent 'monopoly'
is not a monopoly in a sense relevant to antitrust law.").
138. In the early 1900s, the English Court of Chancery generally disfavored the imposition of equitable
servitudes on the use or resale of chattels after the first sale, and the United States generally
endorsed this approach. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in
the Laz ofProperty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 nn. 67 & 68 (2000); Van
Houweling, supra note 17, at 907-10.
139. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 1464-69; Van Houweling, supra note 17, at 910-14.
140. Adam Mossoff argues that linking the exhaustion doctrine to traditional judicial hostility to use
restrictions on chattels is anachronistic given that patents were historically treated as sharing
attributes of both real estate and chattels and it was not until modern times that patents were
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However, a simple juxtaposition of the doctrine of patent exhaustion and
the common law rules on chattel servitudes can only explain where the courts
might have derived the idea of mandatory exhaustion. This juxtaposition does
not offer an operative theory about why mandatory exhaustion ought to be the
rule. Such a theory has to come from an explanation about the potential ration-
ales behind the common law rules on chattel servitudes themselves. One such ra-
tionale, as suggested by Judge Lurton, is that common law's objection to chattel
servitudes serves the purpose of promoting the free transfer of property rights in
chattels.141 But given that common law has been much more receptive to servi-
tudes on real property,142 the ultimate question is what, if any, makes the free
transfer of property rights so much more important for chattels than for real
property.
In an influential article from the 1920s, Zechariah Chafee pondered the
question of what might justify common law's hostility toward chattel servi-
tudes.143 Chafee acknowledged that judicially enforcing equitable servitudes on
chattels would require balancing the interests of manufacturers against those of
consumers and distributors and would also require taking into account the cost of
such judicial enforcement.144 Despite this difficult balancing task, Chafee ex-
pressed optimism that "the complexities and variety of modern business may
eventually present opportunities for restrictions on personalty which are free from
the disadvantages of restraint of trade and when that time comes the appropriate
equitable machinery is ready for use."145 Decades later, Chafee had a second
redefined as personal property. See Mossoff, supra note 17, at 719 nn. 84 & 85. This argument,
however, fails to recognize that regardless of whether patents are characterized as real or personal
property, the exhaustion doctrine only concerns restrictions imposed on personal property. So even
though patents were once considered to possess certain characteristics of real property, that, in and
of itself, does not make the analogy between the exhaustion doctrine and common law rules on
chattel servitudes out of sync with the historical period in which the exhaustion doctrine was born.
141. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907) ("A prime objection to the
enforceability of such a system of restraint upon sales and prices is that they offend against the
ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery. The right
of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and
restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best
subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand.").
142. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 1449 ("Anglo-American property law has recognized contractually
created servitudes on real property for over four centuries."); Van Houweling, supra note 17, at
891-906 (discussing the common lawjurisprudence ofland servitudes).
143. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928).
144. Id at 1013 ("Against the persuasive effect of analogous property interests and the advantages of
such restrictions to manufacturers and to the marketing process must be offset not only the
economic claims of consumers and independent wholesalers and retailers, but also the immense
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thought on the issue and became less convinced of the reasonableness of chattel
servitudes.146 But Chafee's newly found objection to chattel servitudes was not
an objection to chattel servitudes per se, but an objection to courts enforcing
chattel servitudes without taking into account whether they were consistent with
public policy.147 Chafee still favored the weighing of the public policy implica-
tions of specific chattel servitudes on a case-by-case basis 48 rather than an
across-the-board prohibition of all chattel servitudes, as is the case under the
mandatory rule of patent exhaustion.
Unlike Chafee, Robinson was unreserved in his objection to common law's
reluctance to recognize use and resale restraints on personal property.149 Robin-
son argued that the common law policy against restraints on alienation "makes for a
very flimsy argument" against allowing such restraints in the case of personal prop-
erty. 50 "To the extent that such restraints are valid for real property," Robinson
argued, "they should be valid, paripassu, for personal property.""' Robinson fur-
ther argued that "such restraints in principle ought to be equally valid for intellec-
tual property" insofar as patent exhaustion is grounded on this policy.152
Not everyone, however, is skeptical about the common law rule on chattel
servitudes. Van Houweling contended that common law's reluctance to enforce
chattel servitudes can be explained by the high costs of identifying and verifying
information related to such servitudes.153 Van Houweling argued that given the
relatively low value of chattels and the rapidity with which chattels are ordinarily
sold, refusals to enforce chattel servitudes serve a socially desirable function, by
146. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250-63 (1956) (criticizing a New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling for
enforcing restrictions on the use of ajukebox installed on the premise of a luncheonette).
147. See id at 1258 ("The big point is that the imposition of a novel burden, either on land or a chattel or
both, ought not to depend solely on the will of the parties. The validity or invalidity of the burden
they want to create ought to depend on considerations of public policy.").
148. Chafee's preference for case-by-case deliberations on the public policy implications of chattel
servitudes is clear since the inquiries he argued were necessary for such deliberations were all
tailored to the specific servitude in question. See id ("Do business needs make it desirable to create
this novel burden? Does its enforcement involve such grave possibilities of annoyance,
inconvenience, and useless expenditure of money that it should not be allowed?").
149. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 1449 ('This Article argues that the traditional hostility to use and
resale restraints on personal property is misguided in both the common law and intellectual
property contexts.").
150. Id at 1453.
151. Id
152. Id Robinson included the first sale doctrine in his discussion. The first sale doctrine is the
counterpart of patent exhaustion in copyright and trademark laws. See id at 1452 n.13.
153. Van Houweling, supra note 17, at 914-16. Guy Rub also proposed a similar theory to justify the




avoiding the addition of "an extra level of informational complexity to what
might otherwise be relatively simple and fluid commerce."154 By contrast, Van
Houweling explained, courts have been more willing to enforce patent re-
strictions on manufacturing licensees because "[a] manufacturer who produces
patented articles can reasonably be expected to pay attention to the terms of his
manufacturing license, considering that the essence of the license is the permis-
sion it grants the licensee to do that which would otherwise be forbidden by the
Patent Act."5
Van Houweling's information cost theory, however, does not provide a jus-
tification for patent exhaustion being a mandatory rule. As a threshold matter,
although it might be accurate to characterize personal property in day-to-day use
as having relatively low values, the same may not hold true for patented articles
purchased as production inputs or inventory, whose value could be quite signifi-
cant over time.5 But even assuming that patented articles are generally of low
value, Van Houweling's information cost theory could only explain why patent-
ees should not be allowed to impose patent restrictions through notices affixed to
patented articles: Purchasers may overlook such notices,"' and more importantly,
they would have to "take the time and energy to understand and take account of'
the patent restrictions specified in the notices a socially undesirable investment
when the value of the patented articles is low." The theory does not explain
why patent restrictions should not be enforceable when purchasers have actual
knowledge, as opposed to mere notice, of such restrictions. Indeed, Van
Houweling conceded that when a purchaser could not plausibly claim that "it
could have been confused by, inattentive to, or otherwise cognitively burdened
by" the existence of a patent restriction, enforcing the restriction appears to be
154. Van Houweling, supra note 17, at 915.
155. Id at 919. Like Molly Van Houweling, Jay Dratler also justified patent exhaustion on information
cost concerns. SeeJAY DRATLER,JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.05 (2014)
("'The doctrine avoids burdening purchasers of protected chattels with the inconvenience, increased
transaction costs and general inefficiency that would attend requiring them to trace the patent
pedigree of every object in their possession and comply with various restrictions upon their use or
resale to which the purchasers had never agreed.").
156. One example of the purchases of patented articles as inputs was the purchases of micro-
processors and chipsets by Quanta from Intel in the Quanta case. Quanta combined those
microprocessors and chipsets with other components to assemble computers. See supra notes
62-67 and accompanying text.
157. See Van Houweling, supra note 17, at 915 ("[It must be recognized that not one purchaser in many
would read such a notice, and that not one in a much greater number, if he did read it, could
understand its involved and intricate phraseology.") (quoting Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,
243 U.S. 490,501 (1917)).
158. Id
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the correct outcome.159 This concession runs diametrically opposed to the no-
tion of mandatory exhaustion, which rejects all patent restrictions on purchasers,
including those the purchasers have actual knowledge of
2. The Default-Plus Rule
While the mandatory rule of exhaustion lacks a clear theoretical basis, the
theoretical justification for the default-plus rule of exhaustion is strong. As dis-
cussed below, such a justification lies in the role of patent exhaustion in protect-
ing and enabling fair bargaining over the value of the patented articles. This role
simply requires patent exhaustion to be a default rule, not a mandatory rule.
To appreciate the purpose of patent exhaustion, one has to start with the ex-
tremely broad rights granted to patentees under the Patent Act. The Patent Act
specifies that patentees enjoy exclusive rights to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or
import a patented invention, with no explicit limitations on when patentees could
exercise these rights.'60 Without a judicial construct limiting the timing of the ex-
ercise of these rights, a patentee could impose a patent restriction pursuant to its
patent rights at any point in time, including after a patented article has been sold
when the restriction in question is not a condition of the sale.
Such after-the-fact restrictions would pose fundamental problems for the
sale of patented articles, or, for that matter, the sale of any articles of merchandise.
A principle underlying all property sales is that the value of the property to the
buyer necessarily depends on the uses to which the property could be put."'
When the sale of an article of merchandise is not subject to express restrictions on
the possible uses of the article (including its resale), the price the buyer will be
willing to pay for the article supposedly reflects the article's unrestrained uses. In
such cases, the imposition of after-the-fact restrictions on the uses of the article
159. Id. at 920 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in General Talking Picture Corp. v. Western
Electric Co. and its relevance to the information-cost theory). Van Houweling argued, however,
that this situation was a special instance to which her information-cost theory did not apply. See id.
at 920-21.
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.").
161. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tenn.Valley Auth. v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811,
816-17 (1941) ("They will consider all the elements of value inherent in the property, including the
uses to which it was being put as well as the uses it was reasonably susceptible to, which would add
to its market value."); W. Jefferson Levee Dist. v. Coast Quality Const. Corp., 640 So. 2d 1258,
1273 (La. 1994) ('The jurisprudence has always held in takings cases that the fair market value is
the price a buyer is willing to pay after he has considered all of the uses to which the property may
be put .... ).
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(including its resale) would cause diminution in the market value of the article,
upsetting the bargain the purchaser and the seller struck over the value of the arti-
cle at the time of its sale.
Protecting fair bargaining over the value of the patented article, therefore,
could provide one explanation for the courts' refusals to enforce after-the-fact pa-
tent restrictions. Arguably this factor was at work in some of the earlier Supreme
Court cases on patent exhaustion. In Adams v. Burke, for example, while the pa-
tentee imposed geographical restrictions on the licensee's rights to make, use, and
sell the patented coffin lids, no such restrictions were imposed on the purchaser
when it purchased the coffin lids from the licensee.' The purchaser therefore
supposedly paid a price for the coffin lids based on its belief that their uses would
be unrestricted.163 Allowing the patentee to enforce the geographical restrictions
on the uses of the coffin lids against the purchaser after the sale had been con-
summated would unwind the bargain between the purchaser and the seller, an
outcome the Supreme Court refused to judicially sanction. Similarly, the out-
come in Keeler v. StandardFolding Beds Co. could be explained by the fact that the
sale of the patented articles to the purchaser in that case was not, at the time of
the sale, subject to the geographical restriction the plaintiff imposed on the man-
ufacturing licensee.164 Again, allowing such after-the-fact restrictions would be
162. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 454-55 (1873) ("[The purchaser] has used in his business
... no coffin containing the invention secured by said letters-patent, except such coffins containing
said invention as have been manufactured by [the licensee], within a circle, whose radius is ten
miles, having city of Boston as its centre, and sold within said circle by [the licensee], without
condition or restriction.").
163. There is no indication that the purchaser in Adams was even aware of the geographical limitations
on the rights of the licensee from whom it purchased the coffin lids. Id at 457.
164. The majority in Keeler emphasized that:
[W]hen [a patentee] has himself constructed a machine and sold it without any
conditions, or authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it, or to construct,
use, and operate it, without any conditions, and the consideration has been paid to
him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the patentee must be un-
derstood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases
to have any interest whatever in the patented machine so sold and delivered or au-
thorized to be constructed and operated.
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) (quoting Mitchell v. Hawley, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 546-47 (1872)). The dissent in Keeler hinted that the defendant purchaser
was filly informed of the rights of the plaintiff assignee in Massachusetts. Id at 672 (Brown, J.,
dissenting) ('Yet we are asked to hold in this case that one who is filly informed of the rights of
territorial assignee may deal in the patented articles in defiance of such assignee, upon the ground
that he has once submitted to the exactions of the patentee by purchasing the article of one who
had a right to sell it."). But merely informing the purchaser of the conflicting rights of another
assignee is not the same as placing express restrictions on the rights conferred upon the purchaser,
which does not appear to be the case in Keeler.
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unfair to the purchaser, who presumably based its bargaining over the value of the
patented articles on the assumption of unrestricted uses.
Prohibiting after-the-fact restrictions not only protects fair bargaining over
the value of the patented article it enables it in the first place. To see this point,
imagine a world in which there is not a rule of patent exhaustion, namely, a world
in which a patentee is allowed to impose restrictions on the use or resale of a pa-
tented article without being required to inform the purchaser of the restrictions at
the time of the sale of the patented article."' In such a world, the purchaser faces
an enormous amount of uncertainty as to what restrictions might be imposed by
the patentee in the future it could be a minor restriction that will not substantially
hinder the purchaser's use of the patented article, or it could be a major restriction
rendering the patented article entirely useless. This uncertainty makes it very dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for the purchaser to assess the value of the patented art-
icle.' 66 It is conceivable that if the uncertainty surrounding the rights that come
with a purchase proves to be too much to bear, some risk-averse purchasers may
forego the purchase altogether. Seen in this light, the doctrine of patent exhaus-
tion could be understood as a way of preventing the seller from imposing after-
the-fact restrictions so as to force the purchaser and the seller to bargain over the
value of the patented article based on specific patent restrictions known to the
purchaser at the time of the purchase.
Conversely, when the patentee has expressly laid out a patent restriction at
the time of the sale of a patented article, it is no longer necessary to rely on patent
exhaustion to protect and enable fair bargaining between the purchaser and the
seller over the value of the patented article. As long as the patent restriction is an
express condition of the sale, the purchaser will take the restriction into account
in arriving at the price it will be willing to pay for the patented article. As the
165. This is not a purely hypothetical scenario. The patentee in Motion Picture Patents attempted to
impose after the fact restrictions through a notice that stated:
The sale and purchase of this machine gives only the right to use it solely with mov-
ing pictures containing the invention of reissued patent No. 12,192, leased by a l-
censee of the Motion Picture Patents Company, the owner of the above patents and
reissued patent, while it owns said patents, and upon other terms to be fixed by the
Motion Picture Patents Company and complied with by the user while it is in use
and while the Motion Picture Patents Company owns said patents.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1917) (emphasis
added).
166. To put a value on the patented article in such circumstances, the purchaser would need to estimate
the types of patent restrictions that might be imposed by the patentee in the future and the
probability of each type of restrictions being imposed. The final value of the patented article to the
purchaser will be the weighted average of the value of the article under each possible restriction.
This evaluation process requires a large amount of information to which the purchaser may not
have access. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 17, at 887-88.
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Federal Circuit noted in B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, in an ex-
pressly conditional sale, "it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a
price that reflects only the value of the 'use' rights conferred by the patentee." 6 '
This does not mean that the patentee has complete freedom to impose whatever
patent restrictions it wants to, as it is still not allowed to impose patent restrictions
that violate public policy and constitute patent misuse.' The rule of patent ex-
haustion itself, however, only serves the public policy of protecting and enabling
fair bargaining over the value of the patented article.
In sum, patent exhaustion could be best understood as a judicial construct
that injects a time dimension into the otherwise timeless grant of patent rights
under the patent statute. It forces the patentee to exercise its patent rights with
respect to a patented article at the time of its sale so as to facilitate the sale. This
purpose only requires patent exhaustion to be a default rule that kicks in when the
patentee does not exercise its patent rights at the time of the sale. A broader con-
ceptualization of patent exhaustion as a mandatory rule a rule that applies regard-
less of whether the patentee exercises its patent rights at the time of the sale finds
no support in this fair bargaining rationale.169
B. Malleability
Not only does the mandatory rule of patent exhaustion stand on weaker
theoretical ground than the default-plus rule, it is also less malleable than the
default-plus rule in accommodating socially beneficial patent restrictions. As
167. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
168. That is the "plus" part of the default-plus rule of patent exhaustion. See supra Part II.
169. It is worth noting, however, that although this fair bargaining rationale provides a solid theoretical
justification for allowing a patentee to retain its patent rights with respect to a sold patented article
through a patent restriction imposed as an express condition of the sale, it does not address the
question of what actions would be required to make a patent restriction an express condition of the
sale. One recurring question that courts have wrestled with is whether a patentee could enforce a
patent restriction under patent law by merely affixing a notice to the patented article. This kind of
label notice was involved in a number of leading Supreme Court cases on patent exhaustion. See
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11 (1912) (attaching a notice to patented stencil-duplicating
machines requiring the machines to be used only with supplies made by the patentee); Bauer &
Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1913) (attaching a label to patented chemical products
requiring the products to be resold at a price not less than one dollar); Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1917) (attaching a label to patented motion
picture projectors requiring the projectors to project a specific kind of motion picture films made by
the patentee); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180 (1938) (attaching a
label to patented amplifiers requiring the amplifiers to be used for private use only). The answer to
this question would depend on whether the notice would be considered to constitute a valid
condition of the sale under the law governing sales and licenses. This is an important question, but
is not within the scope of this Article.
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detailed below, the mandatory rule could only recognize socially beneficial patent
restrictions through ad hoc carve-outs, while the default-plus rule could evaluate
patent restrictions in a more flexible manner.
1. The Mandatory Rule
The mandatory rule of patent exhaustion is supposedly mandatory, cutting
off the patentee's rights after a patented article has been sold. But occasionally,
courts see compelling reasons for enforcing a patent restriction against a pur-
chaser. In such cases, courts would have to create special carve-outs from man-
datory patent exhaustion in order to rule for the patentee. Yet there are only so
many ways in which such special carve-outs could be created, and socially bene-
ficial patent restrictions that do not fit any of them are thrown into legal limbo.
The first time a court attempted to bypass patent exhaustion was in the
1872 case of Mitchell v. Hawley, where a patentee tried to prevent a purchaser
from using, during the patent's extended term, patented machines constructed
during the patent's original term.170 Apparently motivated by the fact that the
patentee expressly stipulated in the license to the manufacturing licensee that no
rights were conferred beyond the expiration of the patent's original term,"' the
Supreme Court held that the patentee could still enforce the patent restriction
even after the patented machines had been sold to the purchaser.172  To get
around patent exhaustion, the Court relied on nemo dat quod non habet, the legal
doctrine that denies a purchaser rights that the seller does not have even if the
purchaser is innocent. 173
The principle of nemo dat quod non habet, however, is an exception that
threatens to swallow the rule of patent exhaustion. When a patentee imposes a
patent restriction on a manufacturing licensee, the point in contention is whether
the restriction will be enforceable against a downstream purchaser who purchases
from the manufacturing licensee. Nemo dat quod non habet automatically turns a
patent restriction on the manufacturing licensee into a patent restriction on the
purchaser, regardless of whether the purchaser has knowledge of the restriction. 174
170. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544,545 (1872).
171. Id at 544.
172. Id at 550-51.
173. Id at 550 ("Persons ... who buy goods from one not the owner, and who does not lawfully
represent the owner, however innocent they may be, obtain no property whatever in the goods, as
no one can convey in such a case any better title than he owns, unless the sale is made in market
overt, or under circumstances which show that the seller lawfully represented the owner.").
174. Recall that the Supreme Court in Mitchell held that the purchaser did not need to have notice of a
patent restriction for it to be enforceable against the purchaser, because "the law imposes the risk
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Under this principle, the sale of a patented article will never exhaust the patentee's
rights with respect to the article, as long as the patentee imposes a valid restriction
on the manufacturing licensee that manufactures the article.
As if realizing this grave implication, the Supreme Court quickly turned
away from nemo dat quod non habet the next time it addressed patent exhaustion.
In Adams v. Burke, which involved a patentee enforcing against a purchaser a ge-
ographical restriction originally imposed on a manufacturing licensee,"' the
Court stuck to the rhetoric initially used in Bloomer v. McQuewan, proclaiming
that when a patentee sells a patented article, "[t]he article, in the language of the
court, passes without the limit of the monopoly.""' The difference in the Court's
handling of essentially the same factual situation in Adams and Mitchell is strik-
ing. In Adams, instead of holding that the patent restriction imposed on the
manufacturing licensee automatically applied to the purchaser under the principle
of nemo dat quod non habet, the Court opted for the contrary rule, treating the first
sale of a patented article as an event extinguishing the patentee's rights with re-
spect to the sold article."'
After its brief dabble in nemo dat quod non habet, the Supreme Court needed
new ways of bypassing patent exhaustion when necessary without gutting the
doctrine altogether. The Court found one in General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co., where it allowed a patentee to enforce a "private use only" pa-
tent restriction against a purchaser when the patentee only imposed the re-
striction on the manufacturing licensee."' Although it did not explicitly explain
the public policy reason for upholding a field-of-use restriction like the "private
use only' restriction at issue, the Court in General Talking Picture appeared to be
motivated by the fact that field-of-use restrictions were widely used and were al-
ways legal.179 Indeed, field-of-use restrictions are generally considered pro-
competitive, as "the ability to provide different licensing terms for different users
upon the purchaser, as against the real owner, whether the title of the seller is such that he can make
a valid conveyance." Id
175. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453-54 (1873). The patentee in Adams was trying to prevent a purchaser from
using patented coffin lids in a town outside of the area assigned to the manufacturing licensee that
manufactured the coffin lids. See id
176. Id at456.
177. Id at 456, n.2.
178. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Corp., 304 U.S. 175,179 (1938).
179. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Corp., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) ("The practice of
granting licenses for a restricted use is an old one .... So far as appears, its legality has never been
questioned. The parties stipulated that 'it is common practice where a patented invention is
applicable to different uses, to grant written licenses to manufacture under United States Letters
Patents restricted to one or more of the several fields of use permitting the exclusive or non-
exclusive use of the invention by the licensee in one field and excluding it in another field."')
(citations omitted).
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can encourage broader licensing of inventions.""so Specifically, the licensing ar-
rangement in General Talking Pictures "allowed the patentees to reserve the right
to manufacture for commercial use, which was apparently more profitable, while
still allowing the technologies to be used broadly for home applications.""' To
extend a field-of-use restriction to a purchaser, however, the Court needed to
override patent exhaustion, which, under the case law thus far, conferred an "ab-
solute property" on the purchaser.' The Court was able to do that in General
Talking Pictures by taking advantage of the fact that the sale from the manufac-
turing licensee to the purchaser was outside the scope of the licensee's license.
Patent exhaustion did not apply here, the Court reasoned, because the patentee
did not authorize the licensee to sell the patented machines for commercial use
and the purchaser was not a "purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade."183
This method of bypassing patent exhaustion, however, is very idiosyn-
cratic and arbitrary. The patentee in General Talking Pictures was able to en-
force its "private use only" restriction against the purchaser only because the
restriction happened to limit the sales that could be made by the manufact-
uring licensee since the sale itself was not authorized by the patentee, patent
exhaustion did not apply and the patentee still retained its rights against the
purchaser. Essentially, this creates an ad hoc carve-out from patent exhaustion
for a particular type of field-of-use restrictions imposed on a particular group of
licensees-manufacturing licensees. This ad hoc carve-out would not be availa-
ble to enforce patent restrictions that do not limit the sales of a manufacturing li-
censee.184 Nor would it be available to a patentee who sells the patented articles
itself, in which case the sales are, by definition, authorized."' These artificial dis-
180. Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent Infringement Through Field-of-Use
Licensing, 49WM. &MARY L. REv. 157,159 (2007).
181. Id.
182. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895).
183. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 181. This statement is now routinely interpreted as
requiring a sale to be authorized by the patentee before it can exhaust the patentee's rights with
respect to the sold article. See, e.g, Server & Casey, supra note 24, at 573 ("[T]he Court confirmed
that only a first sale that is authorized by the holder of the patent right (as opposed to an infringing
sale) triggers exhaustion that renders a post-sale restriction on the buyer of the patented product
unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy.").
184. Had the patentee in General Talking Pictures only required the patented amplifiers to be used for
private purposes only and not required the manufacturing licensee to only sell the patented
amplifiers for private purposes, the sale to the purchaser would have been an authorized sale and the
patentee would not have been able to enforce the "private use only" restriction against the
purchaser. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 180-81.
185. See Hungar, supra note 97, at 538 n.108 ("To be sure, the patent holder by definition cannot make
an unauthorized sale . . . ."). Had the patentee in General Talking Pictures manufactured and sold
the patented amplifiers itself and imposed the same "private use only" restriction on the purchaser,
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tinctions, based on the form of the patent restriction and the identity of the seller,
are irrelevant to the policy considerations underlying patent exhaustion and lead
to "formalistic line-drawing."" 6 Yet under the mandatory rule of exhaustion,
they have become the decisive factors in deciding whether a patent restriction is
enforceable against purchasers."' This outcome is "anomalous" and "make[s] lit-
tle economic sense."188
After General Talking Pictures, the next occasion on which the Supreme
Court found it necessary to bend the mandatory rule of exhaustion to accommo-
date a socially beneficial patent restriction against purchasers arose in the 2013
case of Bowman v. Monsanto Co.189 In Monsanto, the plaintiff owned certain pat-
ents for a genetically modified soybean seed that allowed soybean plants to sur-
vive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides.190 The
plaintiff sold, and allowed other companies to sell, the patented seeds under a
special licensing agreement that permitted a grower to plant the seeds in one
growing season only.191 Knowing about the licensing restriction, the defendant
farmer purchased soybeans intended for human or animal consumption from
other local farmers and planted them in his fields, with the anticipation that
many of them contained the plaintiffs patented technology. 19 2 The defendant
then applied a glyphosate-based herbicide to the plants, and the plants that
survived the herbicide produced a crop of soybeans with the patented anti-
glyphosate trait. The defendant saved the seeds from that crop to use in his late-
season planting next year and repeated this practice for eight growing seasons.193
When sued for violating the "one season only" licensing restriction for
the use of the seeds, the defendant invoked patent exhaustion and argued that
the plaintiff could not control the use of the seeds after they were sold.194 The
the patentee would not have been able to prevent the purchaser from using the amplifiers for
commercial purposes under the mandatory rule of patent exhaustion.
186. See Server &Casey, supra note 24, at 581.
187. See Holman, supra note 97 ("In Quanta, the Supreme Court cited Talking Pictures with approval,
apparently clearing the way for a patent owner to restrict the use of a product by sales through a
licensee in a manner that would not be permitted if the patent owner sold the product directly.").
188. Id ("This is dearly an anomalous outcome, and seems to make little economic sense. If this sort of
restriction is permissible when accomplished through a licensee, why not let the patent owner
achieve the same result directly?").
189. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
190. Id at 1764.
191. Id
192. Id at 1764-65. The defendant had actual knowledge of the licensing restriction because he
complied with it for his first crop of each growing season. He engaged in the challenged
practice only for the riskier second crop of each season. Id at 1766.
193. See id at 1765.
194. See id at 1764.
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Supreme Court disagreed. The Court saw a compelling reason for Monsanto's
"one season only" license restriction: Without the restriction, "Monsanto's patent
would provide scant benefit."195 That is because "[t]he grower could multiply his
initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum each time
profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor."196 Public
policy, therefore, requires Monsanto's patent rights with respect to the seeds to
not be exhausted upon the sale of the seeds. The Court was able to effectuate this
public policy consideration by holding that "the [patent exhaustion] doctrine re-
stricts a patentee's rights only as to the 'particular article' sold; it leaves untouched
the patentee's ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented
item."197 Since the defendant planted the soybeans he purchased and harvested
many more of them than he started with, the Court explained, he engaged in
making new copies of the patented seeds and therefore was not protected by the
exhaustion doctrine.198 In so holding, the Court essentially created an ad hoc
carve-out from patent exhaustion for a particular type of self-replicating prod-
ucts,199 much like it created an ad hoc carve-out from patent exhaustion for a par-
ticular type of field-of-use restrictions in General Talking Pictures.
These ad hoc carve-outs are capable of saving the patentees from the stric-
tures of patent exhaustion in circumstances where courts believe that deviation
from patent exhaustion is warranted from the standpoint of public policy. The
problem, however, is that such carve-outs are idiosyncratic and cannot save pa-
tent restrictions that are not covered under them, yet may be just as socially bene-
ficial. To exempt those patent restrictions, new carve-outs would have to be
created. But there are only so many ways to create such ad hoc carve-outs, severe-
ly limiting the scope of patent restrictions that could escape patent exhaustion.
Even if courts could get very creative in making new carve-outs available, the lack
of inherent logic in current carve-outs gives patentees no reasonable guidance as
to what the next carve-outs would be.
As a result, some patent restrictions that are arguably socially beneficial are
thrown into legal limbo under the mandatory rule of exhaustion. One example of
195. Id at 1767.
196. Id
197. Id at 1766 (citation omitted).
198. Id at 1766-67. The Court cited the definition of "make" from Webster's Third New International
Dictionary: "'[M]ake' means 'cause to exist, occur, or appear,' or more specifically, 'plant and raise (a
crop)."' Id at 1767 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363
(1961)).
199. The Court emphasized that it was not granting a blanket exemption from patent exhaustion for all
self-replicating products. See id at 1769 ("Our holding today is limited-addressing the situation
before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.").
160
Exhausting Patents
such a patent restriction, for illustrative purposes, is the licensing structure uti-
lized by the MPEG-2 patent pool,200 whose administrator filed an amicus curiae
brief in Quanta in support of the patentee in that case, LGE.20" The MPEG-2
patent pool licenses hundreds of patents essential to the MPEG-2 technology
in single packages to manufacturers wishing to make MPEG-2 products.202
The patents covered by the MPEG-2 pool are implemented at various levels of
the production and distribution process, "from the fabrication of a chip, to its in-
corporation in a circuit board, to the manufacture, sale, and use of a finished
product."203 To encourage individual patentees to enter into the patent pool
arrangement, the MPEG-2 patent pool, like many other patent pools, grant
royalty-free licenses to component manufacturers while reserving the right to
charge royalties at the final stage of the production process, namely, to manufac-
turers that produce finished products to be used by consumers.204 This license
structure, if challenged, might not pass muster under the mandatory rule of ex-
haustion, as royalties are assessed at a time after the patented articles have al-
ready been sold.205 If a court concluded that the MPEG-2 license structure is
indeed socially beneficial, 206 it does not appear that the court would be able to
exempt the license structure from mandatory patent exhaustion under either of
the carve-outs currently available under General Talking Pictures and Monsanto:
200. A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their
patents to one another or to third parties. Patent pools are often associated with complex
technologies that require complementary patents in order to provide efficient technical solutions.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST - A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 3 (Mar. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/
patent pools report.pdf [http://perma.cc/JN4X-E2PL].
201. See Brief of MPEG LA LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937) [hereinafter MPEG-2 Quanta Brief].
202. Id at 2. MPEG-2 is a core platform technology used in every DVD player, DVD-enabled
personal computer, DVD movie disc, digital cable box, and satellite television receiver sold in the
United States and in certain other regions, as well as in all HDTV television sets. Id at 1.
203. Id at 4-5.
204. Id at 5. The administrator of the MPEG-2 pool did not explain why this arrangement would
provide greater incentives for individual patentees to join the patent pool. But presumably, this
arrangement would yield a greater amount of royalties than otherwise because the value of the
finished products-on the basis of which royalties are assessed-is greater than those of the
intermediate products. Id
205. The administrator of the MPEG-2 patent pool filed its amicus curiae brief in Quanta in support of
the respondent precisely out of concerns that a ruling for the petitioner would have negative
implications for its own licensing structure. See MPEG-2 Quanta Brief, supra note 201, at 5-6
("An automatic exhaustion rule such as that advocated by Petitioners would needlessly hinder the
ability of patentees to provide patent pools and the procompetitive benefits they offer.").
206. It is not within the scope of this Article to assess whether the MPEG-2 license structure, or for that
matter, any license structure, is indeed socially beneficial. The point to be made here is that the
mandatory rule of exhaustion is not malleable enough to accommodate the MPEG-2 license
structure if it is found to be socially beneficial.
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The sale encompassed under the MPEG-2 patent pool are all authorized sales,
and the products in question are not self-replicating products. Unless the court
could create an entirely new carve-out, it would be difficult to accommodate the
MPEG-2 license structure under the mandatory exhaustion rule.
2. The Default-Plus Rule
In contrast to the inflexibility of the mandatory rule of exhaustion, the
default-plus rule of exhaustion could give legal effects to socially beneficial pa-
tent restrictions without resorting to ad hoc carve-outs. As discussed above, the
default-plus rule of exhaustion allows patentees to enforce all patent restrictions
that are an express condition of the sale, provided that the restrictions pass a
separate patent misuse test.207 This rule is not unique to a particular type of pat-
ent restrictions or a particular type of products; instead, it is capable of accom-
modating all patent restrictions regardless of factual circumstances.
Under the default-plus rule of exhaustion, a court could have given effect to
the patent restrictions at issue in General Talking Pictures and Monsanto without
having to jump through the legal hoops necessary to create an ad hoc carve-out
from classic patent exhaustion. In General Talking Pictures, both the manufact-
uring licensee who sold the patented amplifiers and the purchaser who purchased
them had actual knowledge of the "private use only" patent restriction.2 0 Despite
knowing about the patent restriction and presumably having bargained for a price
commensurate with that patent restriction, the purchaser in that case nonetheless
violated the patent restriction and used the patented amplifiers for commercial
purposes. The default-plus rule of exhaustion would require the nonapplication
of patent exhaustion, provided that the "private use only' restriction does not
constitute a patent misuse. A ruling condoning the "private use only" restriction
under the default-plus rule would no longer need to rely on the artificial distinc-
tion between sales made by a manufacturing licensee and sales made by a patentee
as the ruling in General Talking Pictures did. The patentee in Monsanto, too,
made the "one season only" patent restriction at issue in that case an express con-
dition of the sale, which was known to the defendant purchaser. 209 As long as the
"one season only' restriction is not considered a violation of public policy, it would
be exempted from patent exhaustion under the default-plus rule, again with no
need to create a special carve-out from patent exhaustion for self-replicating prod-
ucts.
207. See Hoerner, supra note 118, at 684-85.
208. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175,179 (1937).
209. See Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761,1766 (2013).
162
Exhausting Patents
Similarly, the default-plus rule allows courts more flexibility in handling
patent restrictions that do not easily fit any of the ad hoc carve-outs under the
mandatory rule. It would be much easier, for example, for courts to evaluate
the MPEG-2 license structure discussed above under the default-plus rule.
To the extent that courts do not view the collection of royalties in the final
stage of the production and distribution process as a violation of public poli-
cy, 210 the default-plus rule would provide a ready way to recognize the MPEG-
2 license structure as lawful, provided that the limited licenses granted to
component manufacturers are an express condition of the sale to those manu-
facturers. Again, under the default-plus rule, giving effects to these socially
beneficial patent restrictions would only require the application of the same
principle as in any other factual circumstances. 211
C. Circumvention
The default-plus rule of exhaustion is superior to the mandatory rule of ex-
haustion in yet another respect: circumvention. As will be discussed below, not
only is the mandatory rule inflexible, it is also formalistic in the sense that patent
exhaustion applies only to sales transactions. This encourages patentees who
wish to enforce patent restrictions on purchasers under patent law to engage in
circumvention efforts by adopting alternative transaction forms or product de-
signs, resulting in social wastes in the process. These social wastes could be
avoided under the default-plus rule, which provides patentees with a viable way of
enforcing patent restrictions with respect to sold patented articles as long as those
restrictions do not constitute patent misuse.
1. The Mandatory Rule
Patentees started making efforts to circumvent patent exhaustion as soon as
it became clear that the Supreme Court was going to stick to the mandatory rule
of exhaustion. In 1917, four years after the Supreme Court declined to apply the
210. Courts have yet to have an opportunity to evaluate the public policy implications of the MPEG-2
license structure. The Supreme Court in Quanta rejected LGE's efforts to collect double royalties,
and another court expressed concerns about such double royalties on antitrust and patent misuse
grounds. See PSC Inc. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510-11 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
The MPEG-2 license structure, however, does not impose double royalties. See MPEG-2 Quanta
Brief, supra note 201, at 5 ("MPEG LA collects only a single royalty for each product.").
211. Consistent with this view, Herbert Hovenkamp argued that "[i]n its current form, the [patent
exhaustion] doctrine is far too draconian-a ham-handed attempt to provide IP-law constraints
that would be much better evaluated under the law of antitrust or misuse." Hovenkamp, supra note
17, at 2155.
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Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. default rule in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell,"' the Court was
confronted in Strauss v. Victor Talking Machine Co., with the question of how to
deal with a patent restriction imposed in a transaction form designed to circum-
vent the mandatory rule of exhaustion.213 In Victor Talking Machine, a patentee
took great pains to label the sales of patented machines as mere "licenses," substi-
tuting the term "license" for the term "sale" and the term "royalty" for the term
"sale price" in the relevant transaction documents.214 This deliberate choice of
words was apparently used for the purpose of enforcing a resale price mainte-
nance clause in the sale contract that required the machines to be resold for not
less than a certain amount." The Supreme Court saw through the disguise and
held that the patentee's license scheme was an attempt to control the prices of
the machines after they had been sold. 16 Such an attempt must be brought
within the purview of patent exhaustion, said the Court, despite the patentee's ef-
forts to characterize the transactions as a license."'
The Supreme Court's holding in Victor Talking Machine certainly makes
sense after all, the applicability of patent exhaustion should not depend on the
language used by the patentee to describe a transaction. But the Court's holding
in Victor Talking Machine created a perverse incentive for patentees to go even far-
ther in their quest to evade patent exhaustion. Under Victor Talking Machine, it
was not enough to merely make nominal changes to the form of the transaction.
Transactions must be made substantively different from a sales transaction in or-
der to escape patent exhaustion. Patentees started doing just that making sub-
stantive changes to the forms of transactions in order to avoid patent exhaustion.
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., for example, the patentee leased its pa-
tented salt-depositing machines on the condition that the machines were to be
used only with salt tablets sold by the patentee.' While the patentee could have
had other motivations in its decision to lease its machines,21 it appears that at
212. See Bauer &Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 15 (1913).
213. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490,493 (1917).
214. Id. at 494-95. In a document entitled "License Notice," the patentee declared, among others, that
the machines covered by the notice were manufactured under patents, that authorized distributors
may assign a right to use the machines to the public or retailers, and that the distributors may
convey the license to use the machines only when a royalty of a certain amount was paid. Id
215. Id at 500 ("There remains for this 'License Notice,' so far as we can discover, the function only, of
fixing and maintaining the price of plaintiffs machines to its agents and to the public, and this we
cannot doubt is the purpose for which it really was designed.").
216. Id at 501.
217. Id.
218. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,491 (1942).
219. There are other explanations as to why a firm may want to lease, rather than sell, its products.
Ronald Coase argued that the lease-only policy of a durable-goods monopolist may be designed to
overcome the time-inconsistency problem in charging a monopolist price for the goods. See
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least part of the calculus was to structure the transaction as a non-sale so as to by-
pass mandatory patent exhaustion-given that the Supreme Court had recently
struck down a similar sales-based tying restriction in Motion Picture Patents on
exhaustion grounds.220
Such circumvention efforts reveal a fatal defect of the mandatory rule of ex-
haustion: The rule is so formalistic that it can be easily evaded. As discussed ear-
lier, the mandatory rule of exhaustion invalidates all patent restrictions on
purchasers as per se unlawful, so that it is unnecessary to evaluate specific patent
restrictions on their own merits."' But since patent exhaustion only applies to
sales of patented articles, it cannot block patent restrictions imposed in a transac-
tion that is genuinely different from a sale. Had the Supreme Court in Morton
Salt relied on the mandatory rule of exhaustion, it would not have been able to
call a stop to the patentee's tying restriction because of the patentee's use of
leasing as the transaction form. The Court did not fall for the trap it rejected the
tying restriction on its own merits, in a stand-alone patent misuse test that was
not tied to patent exhaustion."'
The use of the lease transaction did not help the patentee in Morton Salt be-
cause the Supreme Court found issues with the defendant's tying restriction.2
But when a patentee wishes to enforce a patent restriction that is not consid-
ered to pose public policy problems, it may be beneficial for the patentee to go
extra lengths to structure the transaction as a non-sale. Unless the patent re-
striction could fit in one of the ad hoc carve-outs from mandatory patent exhaus-
tion, which is unlikely given the idiosyncratic nature of such carve-outs,224 there
would be no other ways to escape mandatory exhaustion. In such circumstances,
the mandatory rule creates incentives for patentees to adopt inefficient transac-
tion forms-transaction forms that they otherwise would not adopt.
Patentees may also attempt to evade mandatory exhaustion by making
changes to the design of their products. For example, if a patentee were prevent-
ed by mandatory patent exhaustion from enforcing a "single use only" re-
striction the type of restriction at issue in Mallinckrodt one option for the
Ronald H. Coase, Durability andMonopoly, 15 J.L. &ECON. 143,149 (1972). Michael Waldman
demonstrated that a durable-goods monopolist sometimes has an incentive to eliminate the
secondhand market, and leasing is one method to achieve that goal. See Michael Waldman,
Eliminating the Marketfor Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing, 40 J.L. &
ECON. 61 (1997).
220. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,516 (1917).
221. See Dufresne, supra note 24, at 12.
222. See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 491.
223. Recall that the Supreme Court in Morton Salt adopted a broad patent misuse test that went beyond
antitrust considerations. See id
224. See Holman, supra note 97, at 3.
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patentee would be to design the product in a way that makes it impossible for
the product to be used more than once? The patentee would no longer need
to impose a legal restriction on the use of the product, rendering irrelevant the
question of patent exhaustion. Of course, the ability to enforce a patent re-
striction under patent law may not be the sole reason for changing the design
of a product,2 2 ' but all things being equal, having a formalistic rule like the man-
datory rule of exhaustion can only add to the incentives for patentees to do so.
2. The Default-Plus Rule
Compared to the mandatory rule of exhaustion, the default-plus rule of ex-
haustion is better equipped to mollify patentees' circumvention incentives. As
discussed earlier, the default-plus rule exhausts patent rights with respect to sold
patented articles only in unconditional sales.2 27 Under the default-plus rule, pa-
tentees who wish to enforce a patent restriction against purchasers only need to
make that patent restriction an express condition of the sale. The patent re-
striction may fail the separate patent misuse test under the default-plus rule, but if
so, that would be the case regardless of the form of the transaction. In other
words, patentees would gain no advantages under the default-plus rule by adopt-
ing alternative transaction forms.
Similarly, under the default-plus rule, patentees would have fewer incentives
to opt for alternative product designs solely for purposes of enforcing a patent re-
striction, as they would be able to enforce the restriction through a conditional
sale provided that the restriction is considered legitimate from a public policy
point of view. The sale of a patented article, in and of itself, would not bar the en-
forceability of patent restrictions on purchasers.
CONCLUSION
The puzzle of patent exhaustion demands a solution. This Article advo-
cates that a default-plus rule is one possible answer to the patent exhaustion
225. Whether this is a realistic option will depend on a lot of factors, including the type of use restriction
the patentee wishes to impose, the availability of technology, and cost considerations.
226. Firms may also design their products in a way that excludes rivals who make interoperable
complementary products from the market or extracts overcharges from customers in the
complementary product market. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the Ne,
Economy, 39 FLA. ST.U.L. Rev., 681, 683 (2012).
227. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
228. As discussed earlier, one advantage of the default-plus rule is that the "plus" part of the rule is not
tied to a specific transaction form as is the mandatory rule of exhaustion. See Straus v. Victor
Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490,493 (1917).
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doctrine problem. A default-plus rule is better grounded in theory, more mallea-
ble, and creates fewer circumvention incentives. Essentially, the default-plus rule
could achieve the goals of patent exhaustion with a minimum amount of legal
impediments to socially beneficial patent restrictions and maximum flexibility in
accommodating new technologies and licensing practices yet to come. The sen-
sibility and clarity of the default-plus rule will go a long way toward guiding and
facilitating patent licensing in the modern innovative economy.
